Super-Nash Performance
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📝 Original Info
- Title: Super-Nash Performance
- ArXiv ID: 1912.00211
- Date: 2025-10-23
- Authors: Mehmet S. Ismail
📝 Abstract
In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Further, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n=2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.📄 Full Content
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