Consent-Based Social Network Formation A Survey
📝 Original Paper Info
- Title: Building social networks under consent A survey- ArXiv ID: 1910.11693
- Date: 2020-04-14
- Authors: Robert P. Gilles
📝 Abstract
This survey explores the literature on game-theoretic models of network formation under the hypothesis of mutual consent in link formation. The introduction of consent in link formation imposes a coordination problem in the network formation process. This survey explores the conclusions from this theory and the various methodologies to avoid the main pitfalls. The main insight originates from Myerson's work on mutual consent in link formation and his main conclusion that the empty network (the network without any links) always emerges as a strong Nash equilibrium in any game-theoretic model of network formation under mutual consent and positive link formation costs. Jackson and Wolinsky introduced a cooperative framework to avoid this main pitfall. They devised the notion of a pairwise stable network to arrive at equilibrium networks that are mainly non-trivial. Unfortunately, this notion of pairwise stability requires coordinated action by pairs of decision makers in link formation. I survey the possible solutions in a purely non-cooperative framework of network formation under mutual consent by exploring potential refinements of the standard Nash equilibrium concept to explain the emergence of non-trivial networks. This includes the notions of unilateral and monadic stability. The first one is founded on advanced rational reasoning of individuals about how others would respond to one's efforts to modify the network. The latter incorporates trusting, boundedly rational behaviour into the network formation process. The survey is concluded with an initial exploration of external correlation devices as an alternative framework to address mutual consent in network formation.💡 Summary & Analysis
This paper investigates game-theoretic models of network formation under mutual consent in link creation, exploring the coordination challenges and theoretical insights that arise. The central issue addressed is how networks can form non-trivial equilibria when all actors must agree to create links, a situation where Myerson's work shows that an empty network often results as a strong Nash equilibrium.To solve this challenge, Jackson and Wolinsky propose the concept of pairwise stable networks, aiming for more meaningful network structures. This paper also explores refinements to the standard Nash equilibrium framework, such as unilateral and monadic stability. Unilateral stability relies on advanced rational reasoning about others’ responses to an individual’s actions, while monadic stability incorporates bounded rationality and trust into the formation process.
The key outcome is a deeper understanding of how mutual consent impacts network formation and methods to avoid trivial equilibria. This work is significant as it provides frameworks for modeling social networks under realistic conditions where all participants must agree on connections, offering insights applicable in both theoretical research and practical applications like predicting and analyzing real-world social phenomena.