Open shop scheduling games

📝 Original Info

• Title: Open shop scheduling games
• ArXiv ID: 1907.12909
• Date: 2019-07-31
• Authors: Ata Atay, Pedro Calleja, Sergio Soteras

📝 Abstract

This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of operations) to a different player, we can construct a cooperative TU-game associated with any open shop scheduling problem. We assign to each coalition the maximal cost savings it can obtain through admissible rearrangements of jobs' operations. By providing a core allocation, we show that the associated games are balanced. Finally, we relax the definition of admissible rearrangements for a coalition to study to what extend balancedness still holds.

📄 Full Content

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