Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies

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📝 Original Info

  • Title: Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies
  • ArXiv ID: 2510.19298
  • Date: 2025-10-22
  • Authors: ** 논문에 저자 정보가 제공되지 않았습니다. **

📝 Abstract

Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.

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