A Multi-physics Simulation Framework for High-power Microwave Counter-unmanned Aerial System Design and Performance Evaluation

The proliferation of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) operating under autonomous guidance has created an urgent need for non-kinetic neutralization methods that are immune to conventional radio-frequency jamming. This paper presents a comprehensive multi-physics simulation framework for the design and performance evaluation of a high-power microwave (HPM) counter-UAS system operating at 2.45,GHz. The framework integrates electromagnetic propagation modelling, antenna pattern analysis, electromagnetic coupling to unshielded drone wiring harnesses, and a sigmoid-based semiconductor damage probability model calibrated to published CMOS latchup thresholds. A 10{,}000-trial Monte Carlo analysis incorporating stochastic variations in transmitter power, antenna pointing error, target wire orientation, polarization mismatch, and component damage thresholds yields system-level kill probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. For a baseline configuration of 25,kW continuous-wave power and a 60,cm parabolic reflector (21.2,dBi gain), the Monte Carlo simulation predicts a kill probability of $51.4\pm1.0$% at 20,m, decreasing to $13.1\pm0.7$% at 40,m. Pulsed operation at 500,kW peak power (1% duty cycle) extends the 90% kill range from approximately 18,m to 88,m. The framework further provides parametric design maps, safety exclusion zone calculations compliant with ICNIRP 2020 guidelines, thermal management requirements, and waveguide mode analysis. All simulation codes and results are provided for full reproducibility.

💡 Research Summary

The paper introduces a comprehensive multi‑physics simulation framework for designing and evaluating a high‑power microwave (HPM) counter‑UAS (C‑UAS) system operating at 2.45 GHz. Recognizing the rapid proliferation of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) that can evade conventional radio‑frequency jamming, the authors propose a non‑kinetic, directed‑energy solution that disables drones by inducing catastrophic failures in their onboard electronics.

The system architecture consists of a 48 kW AC/DC power supply, a high‑voltage modulator capable of continuous‑wave (CW) and pulsed operation, a 2.45 GHz cavity magnetron, a WR‑340 rectangular waveguide with a ferrite circulator, a 60 cm parabolic reflector (aperture efficiency 0.55, gain ≈21.2 dBi, 3‑dB beamwidth ≈14.3°), and a tracking subsystem (FMCW radar plus EO/IR camera on a motorized gimbal). The chosen ISM‑band frequency simplifies regulatory compliance and matches the wavelength (12.24 cm) to typical drone wiring lengths (5–30 cm), maximizing electromagnetic coupling.

The electromagnetic propagation model uses the Friis equation, incorporating line losses (waveguide, feed, radome) and antenna gain to compute power density S(R) and electric‑field magnitude |E(R)| as a function of range R. The antenna gain is expressed as G = η_ap·(π·D/λ)², where D = 0.60 m.

For coupling to drone electronics, the authors treat unshielded wiring as a short dipole. The induced open‑circuit voltage is V_ind = E_inc·L_eff·F(θ_wire)·η_pol, where L_eff = L/2, F accounts for wire orientation, and η_pol is the polarization‑mismatch factor. Near the half‑wave resonance (L ≈ λ/2 ≈ 6.12 cm) a quality factor Q ≈ 10 is introduced, modeled with a Gaussian term that can amplify V_ind by a factor of 5–10. This captures the experimentally observed heightened susceptibility of ESC signal wires (typically 5–8 cm long).

Damage to semiconductor subsystems is modeled with a logistic (sigmoid) probability function:

P_kill(|E|) = 1 /