How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach

We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes – cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist–authoritarian coalition excluding resistance – depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance.

💡 Research Summary

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The paper investigates how a conflict‑averse centrist orientation can unintentionally empower authoritarian actors in highly polarized political environments. The authors argue that most existing models of polarization treat opposing camps as symmetric and reduce moderation to a simple ideological midpoint, thereby ignoring the empirically documented behavior of individuals who avoid confrontation for its own sake. Drawing on literature about protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, they introduce a three‑strategy evolutionary game: (1) Resistance (R) – non‑violent opposition to authoritarian encroachment; (2) Authoritarianism/Fascism (F) – actors who are willing to break norms or use coercion; and (3) Conflict‑averse Centrism (C) – individuals who prioritize civility and avoid overt conflict, even when they share policy preferences with either side.

Using the replicator dynamics framework, the authors encode pay‑offs in a 3×3 matrix A, normalizing diagonal entries to zero because only payoff differences matter. The sign pattern of the off‑diagonal entries is grounded in empirical findings: when R meets C, resistance suffers a reputational cost (‑a_R) while centrists gain a signaling benefit (b_C); when R meets F, resistance gains (b_R) and fascists incur a penalty (‑a_F), reflecting the empirical observation that non‑violent resistance can be effective against authoritarianism. The crucial variation lies in the C–F interaction, which the paper studies under two regimes: (i) fascist exploitation of centrists (A_CF = –a_C, A_FC = b_F, denoted F ≻ C) and (ii) mutual benefit (A_CF = c_C, A_FC = c_F, denoted C ↔ F).

In the first regime, the edge dynamics form a strict cyclic dominance R → C → F → R. Each pairwise interaction yields a positive invasion advantage for the indicated direction, creating a directed flow along the simplex boundary. Solving for the interior equilibrium (where all three pay‑offs are equal) yields a unique point with positive coordinates, but linear stability analysis shows it is a repelling focus: the Jacobian’s trace is positive, and the determinant is positive, indicating trajectories spiral outward toward the boundary. Consequently, the system settles onto a heteroclinic cycle—a non‑periodic orbit that spends increasingly long intervals near each vertex, especially the fascist vertex. This mathematical structure captures a “cyclical resurgence” of authoritarianism: resistance may temporarily dominate, but the presence of a sizable conflict‑averse centrist pool drives the dynamics back toward authoritarian dominance.

In the second regime, where C and F mutually benefit, the edge dynamics change: C and F can each invade the other (C ↔ F), while R is still out‑competed by C (C ≻ R). The replicator flow now converges to a stable interior fixed point that represents a coalition of centrists and authoritarians, with the resistance share driven to zero. The Jacobian at this point has a negative trace, indicating local asymptotic stability. Thus, even though resistance is intrinsically stronger than fascism in direct pairwise contests, the existence of a conflict‑averse centrist bloc that tolerates or even rewards authoritarian behavior can lock the system into a durable authoritarian‑centrist alliance.

The authors’ contribution is threefold. First, they formalize conflict aversion as a distinct strategic type, breaking the symmetry assumption of most opinion‑dynamics and polarization models. Second, they demonstrate that empirically plausible payoff structures naturally generate two qualitatively different global outcomes: a heteroclinic cycle that yields periodic authoritarian resurgence, and a stable centrist‑authoritarian coalition that marginalizes democratic resistance. Third, they show that the presence of a third, non‑ideological strategy can overturn the intuitive prediction that a pairwise dominant strategy (here, resistance over fascism) guarantees long‑run success.

Policy implications follow directly. Strategies that rely solely on mobilizing resistance may be insufficient if a large segment of the electorate is conflict‑averse and therefore unwilling to endorse confrontational tactics, even against authoritarian moves. Democratic actors must therefore consider ways to engage or re‑frame conflict‑averse citizens—perhaps by emphasizing procedural fairness, protecting civil discourse, or providing low‑conflict avenues for participation—so that authoritarian actors cannot co‑opt the centrist bloc for legitimacy. The paper thus enriches the toolbox of political scientists and policymakers by linking micro‑level behavioral preferences to macro‑level regime dynamics through a rigorous evolutionary‑game lens.