Reconstructing William Lane Craig's Explanation of Absolute Time based on Mulla Sadra's Philosophy

After the advent of the theory of special relativity, the existence of absolute time in nature was rejected within the society of physics. In recent decades, William Lane Craig has endeavoured to offer an interpretation of the empirical evidence that support the theory of relativity while maintaining the concept of absolute time. His interpretation, however, is based upon supernatural presuppositions due to which it cannot be accepted as a scientific argument. Here, after explaining Craig’s view, we attempt to reconstruct his explanation for absolute time using the concept of general substantial motion of nature, well-known in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy as the most important approach in Islamic philosophy; thereby, proving general time for the natural world. Although Craig considers some evidence from modern physics in his reasoning for absolute time, in this paper, after pointing to some evidence, it is discussed that the approach used here better bridges the gap that exists between the metaphysics and the physics of the argument.

💡 Research Summary

The paper addresses the longstanding debate over the existence of absolute time in the wake of Einstein’s theory of relativity, which replaced Newtonian absolute time with a relativistic, observer‑dependent conception of temporal flow. The authors first outline the classical Newtonian view, where time is an immutable, universal “duration” that orders events independently of any physical processes. They then explain how special and general relativity, through the unification of space and time into a four‑dimensional manifold, rendered this notion untenable by demonstrating that simultaneity, duration, and the rate of clocks depend on the state of motion of the observer.

Against this backdrop, the paper reviews the position of the contemporary analytic philosopher and Christian apologist William Lane Craig. Craig argues that the Lorentzian interpretation of relativity, which retains a privileged “ether” frame, can be salvaged by invoking a theological premise: God exists, possesses a tensed (A‑theory) view of time, and therefore experiences an absolute “now.” From this divine “now” he infers a universal, absolute temporal slice that underlies all physical processes, allowing for an absolute measure of time, length, and motion. The authors note that Craig’s argument hinges on several metaphysical assumptions—God’s existence, God’s temporality after creation, and the necessity of a privileged reference frame—none of which are empirically testable. Consequently, Craig’s defense of absolute time is classified as a theological rather than a scientific argument.

Seeking a non‑theological foundation for absolute time, the authors turn to Islamic philosophy, specifically the doctrine of “substantial motion” (ḥarakat al‑jawharīyah) articulated by the 17th‑century philosopher Mulla Sadra. Sadra rejects the Aristotelian‑Avicennian view that motion is merely an accidental property of static substances. Instead, he posits that all material substances are intrinsically in motion; motion is the very essence of matter, and time is an abstraction derived from this universal motion. In Sadra’s framework, time is not an independent entity but a measure of change that applies uniformly to every existent because the underlying substantial motion is common to the entire cosmos.

The paper reconstructs Craig’s absolute‑time argument by substituting Sadra’s substantial motion for Craig’s theological premises. First, because substantial motion is a physical principle that applies to all matter, the relativistic effects of time dilation and length contraction can be interpreted as relative manifestations of a deeper, absolute temporal flow. Second, Sadra’s metaphysics supplies a universal “general time” without invoking any supernatural being; the universal motion of the universe itself guarantees a single, non‑relative temporal metric. Third, this approach respects the empirical equivalence of Einstein’s, Minkowski’s, and Lorentz’s formulations while providing an ontological grounding for a privileged temporal ordering that is independent of any observer’s state of motion.

The authors argue that, under Sadra’s doctrine, the universe possesses a single, absolute time that is the same for all observers because it is abstracted from the common substantial motion of all material entities. This absolute time is not a hidden ether but an emergent feature of the cosmos’s intrinsic dynamism. Consequently, the need for a divine “now” disappears, and the absolute‑time claim becomes a matter of natural philosophy rather than theology.

In conclusion, the paper demonstrates that Mulla Sadra’s concept of substantial motion offers a viable, non‑theological foundation for absolute time that bridges the gap between metaphysics and modern physics. By grounding the notion of a universal temporal metric in the intrinsic motion of the material world, the authors provide a novel interdisciplinary synthesis that challenges the prevailing relativistic orthodoxy and opens a dialogue between Islamic philosophical tradition, contemporary philosophy of science, and theoretical physics.