The feasibility of launching physical layer attacks in visible light communication networks

Reading time: 5 minute
...

📝 Abstract

One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS - “What You See Is What You Send”. However, especially in the case of infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in a typical office environment. We use estimated Bit Error Rate (BER) as a measure of the effectiveness of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to even hijack legitimate transmission.

💡 Analysis

One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS - “What You See Is What You Send”. However, especially in the case of infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in a typical office environment. We use estimated Bit Error Rate (BER) as a measure of the effectiveness of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to even hijack legitimate transmission.

📄 Content

The feasibility of launching physical layer attacks in visible light communication networks

Grzegorz Blinowski Email: g.blinowski@ii.pw.edu.pl Institute of Computer Science,
Warsaw University of Technology, Nowowiejska 15/19, 00-665 Warszawa, Poland

Abstract One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS - “What You See Is What You Send”. However, especially in the case of infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in a typical office environment. We use estimated Bit Error Rate (BER) as a measure of the effectiveness of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to even hijack legitimate transmission. Keywords: VLC, visible light communication networks, network security, physical layer security, transmission jamming, transmission hijacking

  1. Introduction Visible light communication (VLC) is a wireless optical communication technology through which baseband signals are modulated on the light emitted by an LED: [1] – [3]. The decreasing cost and hence rapid adaptation of LED-based light make VLC a promising communication technique and a significant alternative to radio-based wireless communication. As user demand for data transmission throughput and availability continues to increase, “traditional” radio- based communication systems, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, etc. fail to deliver because of their bounded channel capacity and transmission rates due to the limited radio spectrum available. VLC data transmission networks provide an attractive alternative to traditional wireless techniques. VLC systems have been proposed and implemented both for indoor and outdoor applications – see [2] and [4]. Indoor applications include a range of communication facilities provided today by radio-based WLAN and Personal Area Networks (PAN), and range from: office communication – [5], multimedia conferencing – [6], peer-to-peer data exchange, data broadcasting – especially multimedia such as home-audio and video streams, see: [7] – [10], to positioning: [11], [12]. VLC systems also provide a safe alternative to electromagnetic interference from radio frequency communications in hazardous environments, such as mines and petrochemical plants, and in applications where traditional WLAN communication may interfere with specialized equipment, for example in hospitals and aeronautics [13].

VLC is also starting to be considered as a way of augmenting or even replacing RF networks; for example, a wide range of techniques aimed at VLC based multimedia networks was developed under “hOME Gigabit Access” project (OMEGA) [14] sponsored by the European Union. The usage of smartphone cameras and light sensors brings VLC to the field of mobile computing and sensing. VLC has the potential to evolve into a general WLAN standard – in [15] with the OpenVLC platform, the authors have demonstrated that it is relatively easy with current Software Defined Radio (SDR) toolkits to implement the TCP/IP suite on the VLC medium. One of the areas in which VLC techniques are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The directivity and high obstacle impermeability of optical signals are considered to provide a secure way to transmit data within an indoor environment, making the data difficult to intercept from outside. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS – “What You See Is What You Send” [16]. As the recent history of IT technological progress has taught us, a common mistake in the development of novel communication techniques has been to ignore or marginalize security issues. Such was the case with the IPv4 internet protocol suite, fiber-optics based networks, and more recently, with early adopted WLAN technologies. Currently, the VLC industry seems to be on the same path again: the indubitable “pro-security” physical characteristics of visual light communication have steered the developers’ focus away from the security track.
The shared nature of the medium allows wireless networks to be easily monitored and broadcast on. Attackers may not only easily monitor communication but also launch jamming (denial of service) attacks. Attacks on the physical level that disregard MAC-level protocols can effectively block the network and are not remedied by traditional security mechanisms. A risk a

This content is AI-processed based on ArXiv data.

Start searching

Enter keywords to search articles

↑↓
ESC
⌘K Shortcut