Investigating the Performances and Vulnerabilities of Two New Protocols Based on R-RAPSE

📝 Abstract

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a pioneer technology which has depicted a new lifestyle for humanity in all around the world. Every day we observe an increase in the scope of RFID applications and no one cannot withdraw its numerous usage around him/herself. An important issue which should be considered is providing privacy and security requirements of an RFID system. Recently in 2014, Cai et al. proposed two improved RFID authentication protocols based on R-RAPS rules by the names of IHRMA and I2SRS. In this paper, we investigate the privacy of the aforementioned protocols based on Ouafi and Phan formal privacy model and show that both IHRMA and I2SRS protocols cannot provide private authentication for RFID users. Moreover, we showthat these protocols are vulnerable to impersonation, DoS and traceability attacks. Then, by considering the drawbacks of the studied protocols and implementation of messages with new structures, we present two improved efficient and secure authentication protocols to ameliorate the performance of Cai et al schemes. Our analysis illustrate that the existing weaknesses of the discussed protocols are eliminated in our proposed protocols.

💡 Analysis

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a pioneer technology which has depicted a new lifestyle for humanity in all around the world. Every day we observe an increase in the scope of RFID applications and no one cannot withdraw its numerous usage around him/herself. An important issue which should be considered is providing privacy and security requirements of an RFID system. Recently in 2014, Cai et al. proposed two improved RFID authentication protocols based on R-RAPS rules by the names of IHRMA and I2SRS. In this paper, we investigate the privacy of the aforementioned protocols based on Ouafi and Phan formal privacy model and show that both IHRMA and I2SRS protocols cannot provide private authentication for RFID users. Moreover, we showthat these protocols are vulnerable to impersonation, DoS and traceability attacks. Then, by considering the drawbacks of the studied protocols and implementation of messages with new structures, we present two improved efficient and secure authentication protocols to ameliorate the performance of Cai et al schemes. Our analysis illustrate that the existing weaknesses of the discussed protocols are eliminated in our proposed protocols.

📄 Content

Investigating the Performances and Vulnerabilities of Two New Protocols Based on R-RAPSE
Seyed Salman Sajjadi Ghaemmaghami1, Afrooz Haghbin2 and Mahtab Mirmohseni3

1 Department of Computer Engineering, Science and Research branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
Salman.ghaemmaghami@srbiau.ac.ir

2 Department of Computer Engineering, Science and Research branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
haghbin@srbiau.ac.ir

3 Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
mirmohseni@sharif.edu Abstract Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a pioneer technology which has depicted a new lifestyle for humanity in all around the world. Every day we observe an increase in the scope of RFID applications and no one cannot withdraw its numerous usage around him/herself. An important issue which should be considered is providing privacy and security requirements of an RFID system. Recently in 2014, Cai et al. proposed two improved RFID authentication protocols based on R-RAPS rules by the names of IHRMA and I2SRS. In this paper, we investigate the privacy of the aforementioned protocols based on Ouafi and Phan formal privacy model and show that both IHRMA and I2SRS protocols cannot provide private authentication for RFID users. Moreover, we show that these protocols are vulnerable to impersonation, DoS and traceability attacks. Then, by considering the drawbacks of the studied protocols and implementation of messages with new structures, we present two improved efficient and secure authentication protocols to ameliorate the performance of Cai et al.’s schemes. Our analysis illustrate that the existing weaknesses of the discussed protocols are eliminated in our proposed protocols. Keywords: Authentication, RFID protocol, Privacy, Security, Ouafi Phan privacy model, Traceability, Impersonation

1. Introduction Nowadays, our world is transitioning from an internet of connected individuals to an internet in which everything and everyone is connected, also known as Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a technology which provides a contactless identification through magnetic waves. Health-care, livestock and animal tracking, access control, transportation and supply chain can be mentioned as its applications which play an important roles to prepare the structures for developing the concept of IoT [2-6]. As it is shown in Fig. 1, RFID systems involve three main parts: back-end server, reader and tag. The tag is a microchip which can be attached to different objects with different purposes in an RFID system that falls in one of the three classes: active, passive and semi-active [7]. A passive tag does not have any battery and obtains sufficient energy to reply the reader from the magnetic field achieved through sending the request by the reader. An active tag contains an inner battery, allows it to start a new connection with the reader over than only be a responder. Although the semi-active tag holds an inner battery, it just responds to the received queries from the reader, and performing the internal operations are the only usage of the internal battery [8]. Decreasing the size and cost of RFID tags, have been led to popularity and vast implementation of passive tags in most of novel applications. The back-end server stores all the information of the tags and the readers, and establishes a connection with the tag via tranceiving data with the reader and after investigating the correctness of transferred messages, authenticates the reader and the tag. Although, RFID technology is developing rapidly and providing comfort for users, deficiency of supplying the necessary security, will result in irreparable damages [9]. Therefore, scholars have proposed various type of protocols to provide security and privacy of end-users in RFID systems, which generally classify into four classes based on the deployed cryptographic functions [10]. Full-fledged are the first classes, include ordinary cryptographic functions such as public or private key cryptography systems, one-way hash functions and so forth [2]. Random Number Generators (RNG) and one-way
   Fig. 1. A System model of RFID systems
   hash functions are permitted to use in the second class. The third class is called lightweight, includes RNG functions and Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) checksums[4]. Finally, ultra-lightweight is the last classification, limited to the usage of simple bitwise operators such as AND, OR and XOR [11]. By paying attention to the mentioned classification, several protocols have been presented in the last few years [6, 12-16]. Yeh et al. proposed an RFID authentication protocol based on EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard in 2010 which supplies tag privacy [6]. In 2011, Yoon declared that Yeh et al.’s protocol is still vulnerable to data integrity and forward secrecy prob

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