On the Nature of Time

The paper puts forward a conceptual framework in which the phenomenon of time can be presented and discussed in a proper way. We argue that change is ontologically and epistemologically a more basic phenomenon than time. Time is an abstract entity created by the human mind on the basis of the experience of change. Physical reality is a process of ceaseless becoming and vanishing; time is not a part of that process. Time is the abstract bank in relation to which we measure the intensity and amount of the flow (change) of physical reality. We must differentiate physical reality from abstract entities (language) by means of which we speak about this reality. It is necessary to differentiate a formal description (formulas) from its interpretation: a correct formal description can be interpreted in a logically inconsistent and factually wrong way. We argue that the discourse about the relativity of time joins (mixes) physical reality and language, and gives an inconsistent interpretation of correct formulas. Regarding the future of time, it has been said that physicists are divided between two options: (1) to pin down a “master time”, as a measure of change of physical reality, and (2) to proclaim time “out of existence”. We argue that both options must be adopted, because time is (1) a measure of change, created by the human mind, (2) and time is an abstract entity that does not exist in physical reality.

💡 Research Summary

The paper puts forward a philosophical framework that treats change as the primary ontological feature of reality and regards time as a secondary, abstract construct created by the human mind to quantify that change. The author begins by rejecting the common metaphor of time as a flowing river, instead describing physical reality itself as a river of becoming and vanishing that does not require any external “time‑river” to move. Time, in this view, is an artificial “bank” against which we measure the intensity and amount of the river’s flow.

A central claim is that sophisticated formulas do not guarantee wisdom; the real scientific value lies in a clear ontological basis and logical consistency. The author argues that formal equations can be correct, but their interpretation may be logically inconsistent if it reifies time as a physical entity. This distinction is illustrated by contrasting the standard relativistic interpretation of time dilation (the moving particle’s “time runs slower”) with a purely process‑oriented interpretation (the particle’s decay process simply proceeds more slowly when the particle moves faster). The former mixes the abstract category of time (C3) with physical processes (C1), leading to conceptual confusion.

To avoid such confusion the paper introduces a “matrix of discourse” with three columns: (1) the ontological division of entities into physical, mental, and abstract; (2) the epistemic stages of reality itself, its formal mathematical description, and the ordinary‑language interpretation of that description; (3) the philosophical disciplines of ontology, epistemology, and logic. Within this matrix, time is placed in the abstract world (C3) alongside numbers and language, while space, causality, and change belong to the same abstract domain, even though they are indispensable tools for describing physical reality.

The author further argues that humans have no dedicated sensory organ for time, reinforcing the idea that time is not a physical thing but a conceptual tool. The paper critiques the frequent use of “temporally directed” or “time asymmetry” in physics, claiming that such qualifiers are redundant because the directionality and asymmetry are already properties of the underlying processes.

In the concluding sections the author contends that the two prevailing scientific attitudes—searching for a “master time” versus declaring time nonexistent—are not mutually exclusive. Time simultaneously serves as (1) a human‑made measure of change and (2) an abstract entity that does not inhabit the physical world. Accepting both roles, the paper argues, would resolve the logical and interpretative inconsistencies that currently plague discussions of time in physics and philosophy.