Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place.

💡 Research Summary

The paper traces how South America, a continent now free of nuclear weapons, arrived at this status through the intertwined histories of Argentina and Brazil. In the immediate post‑World War II era both countries launched ambitious nuclear programs, motivated by aspirations for energy independence, industrial modernization, and strategic autonomy. Argentina created the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) in 1950, while Brazil founded the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in 1955, and both attracted foreign expertise—particularly from Germany, France, and the United States—to develop uranium enrichment, fuel‑cycle technology, and research reactors.

During the Cold War, however, the political landscape shifted dramatically. Military coups in the 1960s and 1970s installed authoritarian regimes that viewed nuclear capability as a potential deterrent and a symbol of sovereign power. Secret projects—Argentina’s “Project Prades” and Brazil’s “Project Portugal”—explored high‑enrichment and re‑processing pathways, but never reached the weaponization stage, largely because of limited resources, technical hurdles, and growing international scrutiny.

The turning point came in the early 1980s with the collapse of the dictatorships. Democratic transitions in Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1985) introduced civilian oversight, parliamentary debate, and a pressing need to restore credibility with the global community. The new governments recognized that pursuing a nuclear weapons option would jeopardize foreign aid, trade, and the nascent democratic institutions they were trying to consolidate. Consequently, they adopted a policy of “peaceful nuclear cooperation” and, in 1985, signed the Brazilian‑Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement. ABACC created a unique regional verification regime, operating in close coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to monitor the entire nuclear fuel cycle of both states. This bilateral trust‑building mechanism reduced suspicions, facilitated joint scientific projects, and signaled to the world that South America could manage nuclear technology responsibly without resorting to weapons.

Beyond the historical narrative, the authors develop a theoretical framework linking democratization to non‑proliferation. Democratic regimes are characterized by transparent decision‑making, legislative scrutiny, and an active civil society, all of which raise the political cost of clandestine weapons development. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, can conceal nuclear activities behind military secrecy. The Argentine‑Brazilian case thus illustrates a causal chain: democratization → policy transparency → international cooperation → regional trust → successful non‑proliferation.

In the concluding section the paper argues that the South American experience offers lessons for other regions. While both countries continue to operate nuclear power plants and maintain advanced fuel‑cycle capabilities, the institutional safeguards established during the 1980s remain essential to prevent a future drift toward weaponization. Ongoing support for democratic governance, reinforcement of regional verification bodies like ABACC, and sustained engagement with the IAEA are recommended as the pillars of a durable non‑proliferation architecture. The authors stress that meaningful international initiatives must be built on the foundation of democratic institutions, as these provide the political environment in which trust and cooperation can flourish.