Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change

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📝 Original Info

  • Title: Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change
  • ArXiv ID: 1303.5723
  • Date: 2013-03-26
  • Authors: Researchers from original ArXiv paper

📝 Abstract

Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some of these difficulties. Here we show that RPMs are not adequate to handle iterated belief change. Specifically, we show that RPMs do not always allow for the reversibility of belief change. This result indicates the need for numerical strengths of belief.

💡 Deep Analysis

Deep Dive into Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change.

Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some of these difficulties. Here we show that RPMs are not adequate to handle iterated belief change. Specifically, we show that RPMs do not always allow for the reversibility of belief change. This result indicates the need for numerical strengths of belief.

📄 Full Content

Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some of these difficulties. Here we show that RPMs are not adequate to handle iterated belief change. Specifically, we show that RPMs do not always allow for the reversibility of belief change. This result indicates the need for numerical strengths of belief.

Reference

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