Modal Logics for Qualitative Possibility and Beliefs

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📝 Original Info

  • Title: Modal Logics for Qualitative Possibility and Beliefs
  • ArXiv ID: 1303.5393
  • Date: 2013-03-25
  • Authors: Researchers from original ArXiv paper

📝 Abstract

Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a numerical formalism for reasoning with uncertainty. There has been interest in developing qualitative accounts of possibility, as well as an explanation of the relationship between possibility and modal logics. We present two modal logics that can be used to represent and reason with qualitative statements of possibility and necessity. Within this modal framework, we are able to identify interesting relationships between possibilistic logic, beliefs and conditionals. In particular, the most natural conditional definable via possibilistic means for default reasoning is identical to Pearl's conditional for e-semantics.

💡 Deep Analysis

Deep Dive into Modal Logics for Qualitative Possibility and Beliefs.

Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a numerical formalism for reasoning with uncertainty. There has been interest in developing qualitative accounts of possibility, as well as an explanation of the relationship between possibility and modal logics. We present two modal logics that can be used to represent and reason with qualitative statements of possibility and necessity. Within this modal framework, we are able to identify interesting relationships between possibilistic logic, beliefs and conditionals. In particular, the most natural conditional definable via possibilistic means for default reasoning is identical to Pearl’s conditional for e-semantics.

📄 Full Content

Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a numerical formalism for reasoning with uncertainty. There has been interest in developing qualitative accounts of possibility, as well as an explanation of the relationship between possibility and modal logics. We present two modal logics that can be used to represent and reason with qualitative statements of possibility and necessity. Within this modal framework, we are able to identify interesting relationships between possibilistic logic, beliefs and conditionals. In particular, the most natural conditional definable via possibilistic means for default reasoning is identical to Pearl's conditional for e-semantics.

Reference

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