This overview paper defends an augmented cognitively oriented generic-design hypothesis: there are both significant similarities between the design activities implemented in different situations and crucial differences between these and other cognitive activities; yet, characteristics of a design situation (related to the design process, the designers, and the artefact) introduce specificities in the corresponding cognitive activities and structures that are used, and in the resulting designs. We thus augment the classical generic-design hypothesis with that of different forms of designing. We review the data available in the cognitive design research literature and propose a series of candidates underlying such forms of design, outlining a number of directions requiring further elaboration.
Deep Dive into Design: One, but in different forms.
This overview paper defends an augmented cognitively oriented generic-design hypothesis: there are both significant similarities between the design activities implemented in different situations and crucial differences between these and other cognitive activities; yet, characteristics of a design situation (related to the design process, the designers, and the artefact) introduce specificities in the corresponding cognitive activities and structures that are used, and in the resulting designs. We thus augment the classical generic-design hypothesis with that of different forms of designing. We review the data available in the cognitive design research literature and propose a series of candidates underlying such forms of design, outlining a number of directions requiring further elaboration.
This text is a Post-print of: Visser, W. (2009). Design: one, but in different forms. Design Studies,30(3), 187-223. see linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0142694X08001051 doi:10.1016/j.destud.2008.11.004 There has been much discussion in the design-research community around the relations between design and science (Sargent, 1994), some authors considering that a design science is to be developed (Hubka & Eder, 1987), others, such as Cross (2001b;2002b), judging that the two are to be clearly distinguished. For Hubka and Eder (1987), "design science addresses the problem of determining and categorizing all regular phenomena of the systems to be designed, and of the design process" (p. 124). Cross (2002b) wishes to develop "'design as a discipline', based upon a 'science of design', not a 'design science'" (cf. also Simon, 1969Simon, /1999, characterising the "science of design" in his Sciences of the Artificial). For Cross (2002b), "design science implies an explicitly organised, rational and wholly systematic approach to design; not just the utilisation of scientific knowledge of artefacts, but design in some sense [as] a scientific activity itself.… Science of design refers to that body of work which attempts to improve our understanding of design through 'scientific' (i.e., systematic, reliable) methods of investigation. Let us be clear that a 'science of design' is not the same as a 'design science'. The study of design leaves open the interpretation of the nature of design." (see also Cross, 2001b) "Domain" in the context of "domain independence" is generally equated with a "discipline (of practice)," such as engineering, architecture, computer science, or product design2 . It may be used in a wider acceptation.
Discussing domain-generality versus domain-specificity in cognition, Frensch andBuchner (1999, p. 142, quoted in Zimring &Craig, 2001, p. 126) define a domain as “anything that a given constraint can potentially be generalized to and from.” In this paper, we will be concerned with design “situations” that can be characterised on three main dimensions, that is, the design process, the designers, and the artefact. The augmented generic-design hypothesis translates our claim that, if we do not “eliminate the context” of design (cf. McDonnell quoted previously), we may observe different forms of design in different design situations.
From the early 1980s on, authors in the domain of design research have started to characterise design as a cognitive activity, highlighting the differences from design as it had been represented until then in This text is a Post-print of: Visser, W. (2009). Design: one, but in different forms. Design Studies,30(3), 187-223. see linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0142694X08001051 doi:10.1016/j.destud.2008.11.004 prescriptive models underlying design methods (e.g., Pahl & Beitz, 1977/1996). An important reference for this new, more cognitively oriented approach to design has been Simon’s (1969Simon’s ( /1999) )
The Sciences of the Artificial. At the end of the 1990s, the following characterisation of design was prevailing in the domain of cognitive design research-even if authors may differ regarding certain characteristics (see hereunder xi. Design activity is mostly opportunistically organised). Concerning only two qualities, authors generally continue to adhere strictly to Simon’s (1969Simon’s ( /1999) position and analysis of design (see hereunder i and v). For most characteristics, authors have elaborated on Simon’s characterisation, not so much contradicting him, as extending generally his analysis (see hereunder, especially, points iii, vi, vii, viii, ix, and x). For a last series, they have revised considerably Simon’s position (see hereunder, especially, points ii, iv, and xi) (for a more detailed and more critical discussion of Simon’s, 1969/1999, positions, see Visser, 2006b).
(i) Design is a type of cognitive activity rather than a professional status. In 1969, Simon (1969Simon ( /1999) ) states that “design” is not restricted to engineers, who are not the only professional designers. “Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.” (p. 111) (ii) Design is a problem-solving activity. This is one of Simon’s central stances with respect to design, based on the symbolic information-processing framework developed in Newell and Simon (1972). In addition, Simon qualifies design as an “ordinary” problem-solving activity, that is, a problem-solving activity for which no new and hitherto unknown problem-solving concepts or techniques are necessary. According to his “nothing special” position (presented for scientific thinking in Klahr & Simon, 2001, p. 76), “no qualitatively new components” need to be introduced in the classic general problem-solving mechanisms, in order to be able to handle design problems (Simon, 1973(Simon, /1984, p. 197), p. 197). No “special logic” is necessary (Simon, 1969(Sim
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