A measurement driven, 802.11 anti-jamming system
Dense, unmanaged 802.11 deployments tempt saboteurs into launching jamming attacks by injecting malicious interference. Nowadays, jammers can be portable devices that transmit intermittently at low power in order to conserve energy. In this paper, we…
Authors: Konstantinos Pelechrinis, Ioannis Broustis, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy
A measurement driven, 802.11 anti-jamming system K onstantinos P elechrinis ∗ , Ioannis Broustis ∗ , Srikanth V . Krishnam ur th y ∗ , Christos Gk antsidi s † ∗ Unive rsity of Calif or nia, Riverside † Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK { kp ele, broustis, krish } @cs.ucr.edu christos.gk ant sidis@micros oft.com ABSTRA CT Dense, unm anaged 802.11 deployments t empt saboteu rs into launching jamming attacks by injecting malicio us interfer- ence. No wadays, jammers can be portable de v ices that trans- mit intermittently at low power in o rder to conserve energy . In this pa per , we first cond uct exten si ve experimen ts on an indoor 8 02.11 network to assess the ab ility of two phy sical layer fun ctions, rate ad aptation and power control, in miti- gating jammin g. In the pr esence o f a jammer we find that: (a) the use of pop ular r ate adap tation a lgorithms can sig- nificantly degrade network p erformance and , (b) ap propri- ate tuning of the car rier sen sing thr eshold allows a transmit- ter to send packets even when b eing jamm ed and enab les a receiver c aptur e the desired signal. Based on our findings, we build ARES, an Anti-jamming REinforceme nt System, which tunes the parameters of rate adaptation and po wer con- trol to improve the performan ce in the presen ce of jammers. ARES ensures tha t oper ations und er b enign co nditions are unaffected. T o demonstra te the effectiveness and gen erality of ARES, we ev alu ate it in three wire less testbeds: (a) an 802.1 1n WLAN with MIMO nodes, (b) an 802.11a/g mesh network with mob ile jammers a nd (c) an 802. 11a WLAN. W e observe that ARES improves the network throughput across all testbeds by up to 150%. Categories and Subject Descriptors C.2.0 [ General ]: Security and Pr otection; C.2.3 [ Com puter Communication Net works ]: Net w ork Op e rations General T erms Design, Exp erimentation, Meas uremen t, Performance, Security Keyw o rds IEEE 802.11 , Rate Control, Po wer Cont rol, Jamming, MIMO 1. INTR ODUC TION The widespre ad proliferatio n of 802.1 1 wireless net- works makes them an attra ctiv e tar get for sab oteurs with jamming dev ices [1]. Numerous jamming a ttac ks hav e b een rep orted in the recen t pa st [2, 3, 4 ]; this makes the defense aga ins t such attacks very critical. A jammer tr a nsmits either dummy pack ets or s imply elec- tromagnetic e nergy to hinder leg itimate co mm unications on the wireles s medium. A jamming attack ca n cause the following effects in an 802.1 1 netw or k : (a) Due to carrier s e ns ing, co-channel transmitters detect activity on the medium and thus, defer their packet transmis- sions for pr o longed p erio ds. (b) The jamming signal collides with legitimate pack ets at receivers. As a co n- sequence, the thr oughput is significantly reduced b e- cause of these effects. F requency hopping tec hniques hav e b een previo usly pro posed for av oiding jammers [5 ] [6]. Such schemes howev er, are not effective in scenar - ios with wide- ba nd jammers [7, 8]. F urthermore , g iv en that 80 2.11 op erates on r elativ ely few frequency chan- nels, m ultiple jamming devices op erating on differen t channels ca n significantly hurt p erformance in spite of using fre q uency hopping [9]. More than that, although F requency Ho pping Sprea d Sp ectrum was av ailable in the initial 802.11 standar d, it was not later included in the 802.1 1a/b/g standards that ar e p o pular today [10]. In this pap er, we ask the question: How c an le gacy 802.1 1 devic es al leviate the effe cts of a jammer t hat re- sides on the same channel as a le gitimate c ommunic ating p air, in re al time? W e address this challenge by de- veloping ARES 1 , a nov el, mea suremen t dr iv en system, which detects the prese nce o f jammers and inv o k es rate adaptation and pow er control str ategies to allevia te jam- ming effects. Clearly , not muc h can be done to mitigate jammers with unlimited resource s in terms o f transmis- sion p ow er and sp ectrum efficiency . Note howev er tha t in a plurality of ca s es the jamming device can b e re- source constr a ined, with capabilities s imilar to that of the legitimate device 2 . Portable, battery-op erated jam- mers are typically configured to transmit int ermittently and so metimes at low p ow er, in order to conserve ener gy and har m the netw or k for extended perio ds of time. Ad- ditionaly , misconfiguration of “legitimate” dev ices can transform them to a resource-co nstrained jammer [3]. In thes e and similar cases, ARES c an effectively fight against the malicio us entit y , as we discus s later . Our contributions in this pa per are the fo llowing: 1 ARES [p ron. “´ aris”] w as th e go d of war in Greek mythology; w e choose th e name as a symbol of the com bat with jammers. 2 W e implemen t a jamming utility on a commodity 802.11 NIC as described in more detail in Section 3. 1 1. Understanding the im pact of jammers in an 802.11 net work wi th rate/p ow er con trol. First, we p erform an in-depth measur emen t-bas ed exp erimen- tal study on our indo or testb ed, to quantify the impact of jamming when employing rate a nd/ or power control. T o the bes t of our knowledge, there a re no such studies to date. With ra te control, a tr a nsmitter can increa se or lo wer its transmission ra te dep ending on the obser v ed pack et deliv ery ratio (PDR) at the receiver. With p ow er control, no des may incr ease their tra nsmission p ow ers and/or c le ar channel asses s men t (CCA) thres holds [11] in or de r to increase the proba bilit y of successful packet reception. The design o f ARE S is driven by our tw o key exp erimen ta l obser v ations: i) R ate adaptation c an b e c ounter-pr o du ctive: In the presence o f a jammer that is active intermitten tly (and sleeps in b et ween), the use of ra te ada ptation is not always b eneficial. W e conduct exp eriments with three p opular rate a da ptation alg orithms: SampleRate [12], Ono e [13] and AMRR (Adaptiv e Multi Rate Retry ) [14]. With ev ery s c heme, we observe that the use of r ate adaptation may work in favor of t he jammer! This is bec ause, rate adaptatio n wastes a lar ge p ortion of a jam- mer’s s leeping time in order to gradua lly converge to the “b est” rate. W e a nalytically deter mine when fixed r ate op erations may b e prefer able to the use o f r ate adapta- tion. ii) T uning the c arr i er sense thr eshold i s b ene- ficial: W e collect throughput measurements with many different tra nsmission p ow ers and CCA thres holds. W e find that: (a) In the presence of a jammer, legitimate transmissions with maximum p ow er could lea d to sig- nificant benefits, only when op erating at low data r ates. (b) Increa sing the CC A threshold ca n allow a transmit- ter that is b eing jammed to send pac kets a nd a t the same time, fac ilita te the c aptur e o f pack ets in the pres- ence o f jamming interference; together, these effects can significantly re duce the thro ughput degradation. 2. Designing ARES, a no vel an ti -jamming sys- tem. The ab o ve obs erv atio ns drive the design of ARES. ARES primarily cons is ts of tw o mo dules. The r ate c on- tr ol mo dul e dec ide s betw een fixed-r ate a s signmen t and rate adaptatio n, ba sed on channel conditions and the jammer characteristics. The pr imary o b jective of this mo dule is to effectively utilize the p erio ds when a jam- mer is asleep. The p ower c ontr ol mo dule adjusts the CCA threshold to facilitate the tr ansmission a nd the re- ception ( c aptur e ) of legitimate pack ets during jamming. Care is ta ken to av oid starv a tio n of no des due to the cre- ation of a symmetric links [11]. This mo dule is used to facilitate successful communications while the jammer is a ctiv e. Although ra te a nd p o wer co n tro l hav e be e n prop osed as in ter ference allevia tion tec hniques , their be - havior ha s not b een studied in ja mming e nvironments. Our work is the first to conduct such a study , as dis- cussed later . 3. Implementing and exp erimen tall y v alidating ARES. W e implement and ev aluate the mo dules of ARE S on real hardware, ther eb y making ARES one of the few anti-jamming system implementations for 80 2 .11 net- works. ARES also contains a jammer detection mo d- ule that incor pora tes a mechanism pro posed previo usly in [15]. T o de mo nstrate the effectiveness and general- it y of our sys tem, we a pply it on three different exp er- imen tal netw ork s : a sta tic 802.11 n WLAN with MIMO enabled node s , a n 8 02.11a/g mesh netw ork with mo- bile jammers, and a static 8 02.11a WLAN with uplink TCP traffic. Our mea suremen ts demons tr ate that ARES provides p erformance b enefits in all the three netw or k s; throughput improvemen ts of up to 150% are obser v ed. The r emainder of the pap er is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide so me background on jamming and discuss related studies. In section 3, w e describ e our wireless testb ed a nd the exp eriment al metho dology . W e describ e o ur extensive exp eriments to understand the impact of r ate and p o wer control in the presence of a jammer in section 4. In se c tion 5, we cons truct ARES based o n our obser v ations. W e pre s en t our ev aluations of ARES in section 6 . Section 7 discusses the scop e of our study . W e conclude in section 8. 2. B A CK GR OUND AND RELA TED WORK In this sec tio n, first we briefly describ e the o peratio ns of a ja mmer and its attac k capabilities. Nex t, we discuss relev ant previo us studies. T yp es o f Jammi ng Atta c ks. Jammers can be dis- tinguished in terms of their attack strateg y; a detailed discussion can b e found in [15]. Non-stop jamming: Constant jammers contin uo us ly emit electromagnetic energy on a channel. Now a da y s , constant jammer s are commercially av ailable a nd easy to obtain [1, 7 ]. While cons ta n t jammers emit no n- decipherable messag es, de c eptive jammer s transmit seem- ingly legitimate back-to-back dummy data pack ets . Hence, they can mislead other no des and monitor ing systems int o believ ing that legitimate traffic is b eing sent. Intermittent Jamming: As the name sugge s ts, these jammers are active intermitten tly; the primary goal is to conserve battery life. A r andom jammer typically alter- nates b et ween uniformly-distributed jamming a nd sleep- ing p erio ds; it jams for T j seconds and then it sleeps for T s seconds. A r e active jammer starts emitting energy only if it detects traffic on the medium. This makes the jammer difficult to detect. How e ver, implemen ting reactive jammers can be a challenge. F o r the purp oses of this w ork, we prima rily co nsider the random jammer model. Attac kers ar e mo tiv ated in to using a random jammer be cause putting the jammer to sleep intermitten tly can increase its lifetime and decre a se the proba bilit y of detection [15]. F urthermor e, it is the most ge neralized re presen tation o f a jammer; appro pri- ately cho osing the sleep times could tur n the jammer int o a cons tan t jammer or (with high probability) a reac- tive jammer. Mo reov er, reactive jammer s are not e asily av ailable since they are har der to implement a nd require sp ecial exp e rtise o n the part of the a ttac ker. W e dis cuss 2 the a pplicabilit y of ARES with consta n t a nd r eactiv e jammers, in section 7. Related work. Mos t previous studies employ fre- quency ho pping to avoid jammers. F r e quency ho pping, how ever, cannot alleviate the influence of a wide-ba nd jammer [7, 8 ], whic h can effectively jam a ll the a v a ilable channels. In addition, r ecen t s tudies have shown that a few cleverly-coo rdinated, narrow-band jammers can practically blo ck the who le sp ectrum [9]. Thus, ARES do es not rely on frequency hopping. Studies b ase d on fr e quency hopping: Na vda et al. [5] implement a pro activ e freque nc y hopping proto - col with pseudo - random channel switching. They com- pute the optimal frequency hopping para meter s, assum- ing that the jammer is aw ar e of the pro cedure follow ed. Xu et al. [6] prop ose t wo an ti-ja mming techniques: reac- tive c ha nnel surfing a nd spatial retr eats. How ever, their work is on senso r net works which only supp ort very low data rates a nd transmiss ion p ow ers. Gummadi et al. [16] find that 802.11 devices are v ulnerable to sp ecific patterns of narr o w - band in ter ference r elated to time re- cov ery , dynamic r a nge selectio n and PLC P -header pro- cessing. They s ho w that due to these limitations, an in- telligent jammer with a 100 0 times weak er signal (than that of the legitimate transce iv er ) can still corrupt the reception of pack ets. In order to alleviate these effects, they prop ose a rapid frequency hopping stra tegy . Other r elevant work: Xu et a l. [15] develop ef- ficient mechanisms for jammer detection at the PHY lay er (for all the 4 types of jammers ). How ever, they do not pro pose any jamming mitigatio n mechanisms. In [17], the s ame a uthors suggest that comp etition str ate- gies, where trans c eiv er s adjust their transmissio n p o wers and/or erro r corr ection co des, might alleviate jamming effects. How ever, they neither pr opos e a n a n ti-jamming proto col nor p erform ev a luations to v a lidate their sug- gestions. Lin and No ubir [1 8] present an analy tical ev al- uation of the use of cryptog raphic in ter le a vers with dif- ferent coding schemes to improv e the robustness o f wire- less LANs. In [1 9], the a uthors show that in the a bsence of erro r-correction co des (as with 802.11 ) the jammer can conserve battery p ow er by destroying only a p ortion of a legitimate pack et. Noubir [20] als o prop oses the use of a combination of dir ectional antennae a nd no de-mobility in order to allev iate jammers . ARES can easily b e used in conjunction with dir ectional antennae or with error correctio n co des. Prior wor k on r ate and p ower c ontr ol: Ra te and power control techniques hav e b een prop osed in the lit- erature, as means of mitigating int erference (e.g. [21, 12, 11 , 22] and the references therein). Ho wever, they do no t account for a hostile jamming environmen t; with these schemes, no des co op erate in o r der to mitiga te the impact of ” legitimate” interference, thereby improving the p erforma nce. On the other hand, ARES is sp ecial- ized tow ar ds ha ndling malicious interference of jammers, which attempt to disrupt ongoing communications. Figure 1: The depl oymen t of our wireless testb ed. 3. EXPERIMENT AL SETUP In this sectio n, we descr ibe our wir e less testb ed and the exp erimen tal methodo logy that we follow. T estb ed Des cription: Our wireless testb ed [23] is deploy ed in the thir d flo or of Engineering Building I I, at the Universit y of California, Riverside. Our testbe d consists of 37 So ekris net48 26 no des [2 4], which mount a Debian Linux distribution with kernel v2.6 , over NFS. The no de lay o ut is depicted in Figure 1. Thirty o f these no des are ea c h equipp ed with tw o miniP CI 80 2.11a/g WiFi cards , a n EMP-86 02 6G with Atheros chipset and an Intel-2915 . The other 7 no de s are equipped with one EMP-8602 6G and one R T2860 ca rd that supp orts MIMO-based (802.11n) commun ications. W e use the MadWifi driver [25] for the EMP-8602 6G cards. W e hav e modified the Lin ux client driver [26] of the R T2860 to enable STB C (Space Time Blo ck Co ding) s upport. W e use a propr ietary version of the ipw22 00 AP (acces s po in t) and client dr iv er /firm w are of the Intel-2915 card. With this version we are able to tune the CCA threshold parameter. Exp erimen tal S e ttings and Metho dol ogy: W e exp erimen t with different rate adaptation a lgorithms in the presence o f rando m ja mmers. W e also p erform ex- per imen ts with v a rious transmissio n p ow ers of jammers and p o wers/CCA thres holds of legitimate no des. Our measurements encompa ss an exhaustive se t of wireless links, routes of different lengths, as well a s static and mobile jammers. W e exa mine bo th SISO and MIMO links. W e exp eriment with three mo des of op eration: 802.11 a/g/n (unless other wise stated throughout this pap er, o ur obs e rv ations a re consistent for a ll three mo des of op eration). The exp eriments are p erformed late at night in order to isolate the impac t o f the jammers by av oiding interference fro m co-lo cated WLANs. By de- fault, all devices (legitimate no des and jammers) set their transmiss ion p o wers to 18 dBm. Implementing a r andom jammer: Our implemen- tation o f a random jammer is based o n a sp ecific config- uration (CCA = 0 dBm) and a user space utilit y that 3 sends broa dcast pack ets as fast as p ossible. F or the pur- po ses of res earch, we hav e implement ed our own ra ndom jammer on a n 802 .11 legacy device, by se tting the CCA threshold to 0 dBm. B y setting the CCA thresho ld to such a high v alue, we force the device to igno re a ll legit- imate 80 2 .11 signa ls even a fter carrier sens ing ; pa c kets arrive a t the jammer’s circ uitr y w ith p o wers less than 0 dBm (even if the distances betw een the jammer and the legitima te transceivers a re very sma ll). An effective random jammer should b e able to tra ns mit packets on the medium, as fast a s p ossible, during ra ndom active time in terv als. W e develop a user- space soft ware utility with the following functiona lities: • The jammer tra nsmits bro adcast UDP tra ffic. This ensures that its packets a re transmitted back-to- back and that the jammer do es not wait for a n y A CK messages (by default the bac koff functionalit y is disa bled in 802.1 1 for broadcas t traffic); in other words, this set up a llows the jamming no de to de- fer its back-to-back tr ansmissions fo r the minimum po ssible time (i.e. D I F S + min B ackOf f ). Our util- it y employs r aw so ckets , which allow the constr uc- tion of UDP packets from scratch and the for w ar d- ing of each pack et dir ectly down to the hardware 3 . Note that this implemen tation byp asses t he 802.1 1 pr oto c ol a nd hence, the jammer do es not wait in the back o ff state after each pack et transmission. • Our utilit y schedules uniformly- distributed ra ndom jamming in terv als. The jammer is in the active state fo r a r andom pe r iod o f time, during which it constantly transmits pack e ts back-to-back. It then transits to an idle (sleeping) state for a differe nt, randomly c hosen perio d of time during which it do es not emit energy . The tw o states alternate a nd their durations are computed anew at the b egin- ning of each cycle (a cycle consists of an active and an idle p erio d). W e use a se t of 4 nodes as ja mmers on our tes tb ed; these are equipp ed with Intel-2915 cards which a llo w CCA tuning. T r affic char acteristics: W e utilize the ip erf mea- surement to ol to generate UDP data traffic among le- gitimate no des; the pack et size is 150 0 bytes. The du- ration of each exp erimen t is 1 hour. F or eac h exp er- imen t, w e first enable ip erf tr affic b et w een legitimate no des, and subsequently , we activ ate the jammer(s). W e consider b oth mesh and WLAN connectivity . W e ex- per imen t with different jammer distributions, namely: (a) fr e qu en t jammers , which are a ctiv e a lmo st all of the time, (b) r ar e jammers , which sp end mos t o f their time sleeping, and (c) b alanc e d jammers that hav e sim- ilar av era ge jamming and sleeping times. W e hav e dis- abled R TS/CTS message exchange throug ho ut our ex- per imen ts (a common design decision in practice [27]). 3 Administration priv ileges are required for this op eration. 4. DERIVING SYSTEM GUIDELINES In this section, we descr ibe o ur exp eriment s tow a rds understanding the b ehavioral tr ends of power and rate adaptation techniques, in the presence o f r andom jam- mer(s). Our goa l is to determine if there are prop erties that can b e exploited in order to allevia te jamming ef- fects. W e p erform exp eriments on b oth s ingle-hop and m ulti-hop configur ations. 4.1 Rate Adaptation in Jamming En vironments Rate a daptation algorithms are utilized to select an appropria te transmission rate as p er the current c hannel conditions. As interference levels incr ease, lower data rates are dynamically c hos en. Since legitimate no des consider jammers as interferers, rate adapta tion will r e- duce the transmissio n ra te on legitimate links while jam- mers a re active. Hence, one could p otentially a r gue that rate control on legitimate links incr eases reliability by reducing rate a nd thus, can provide thro ughput benefits in jamming environments. T o examine the v alidity of this a rgumen t, we exp er- imen t with thr ee different, p opular rate a da ptation al- gorithms, SampleRate [1 2], AMRR [1 4] and Ono e [1 3 ]. These algorithms are alre ady implemen ted on the Mad- Wifi dr iv er that we use. F or s implicit y , we first co nsider a balanced jammer, which s elects the sleep duration from a unifor m distribution U [1 , 8] and the jamming duration from U [1 , 5] (in sec onds). Details on the exp erimental pr o c ess: W e per- form exp eriment s with b oth sing le-hop a nd multi-hop configuratio ns. F or each exper imen t, we first lo ad the particular ra te-con trol Linux-kernel mo dule (SampleR- ate, AMRR or Ono e) o n the wireles s car ds of legitimate no des. W e initiate data traffic b et ween the no des and after a ra ndom time, we activ ate the jammer. W e collect throughput measurements on ea c h da ta link once every 500 msec. W e use the following ter minology: 1) Fixe d tr ansmission r ate R f : This is the nominal transmission rate configur ed on the wire le ss ca rd. 2) Satura te d r ate R s : It is the rate a c hieved when R f is chosen to be the r ate o n the wir eless card. In or der to compute R s , for a given R f , we consider links where the pack et delivery ratio (PDR) 4 is 10 0 % for the particu- lar setting of R f ; we then measure the ra te achiev ed in practice. W e notice that for lo wer v alues of R f , the sp ec- ified rate is actually ac hieved on such links. Howev er, for higher v alues of R f (as a n example R f = 54 Mbps), the achiev ed data ra te is muc h low er due to MAC lay er ov er - heads, such as MAC lay er retra nsmissions [28]. T a ble 1 contains a mapping, derived from measurements o n our testbed, b et ween R f and R s . 3) A ppl ic ation data r ate R a : This is the rate at which the application gener ates data. It is difficult (if not imp ossible) to a prior i determine the b est fix ed rate on a link. Given this difficult y , we 4 W e refer to the application lay er packe t deliv ery ratio, which includes the MA C la yer retransmissions. 4 R f 6 9 12 18 24 36 48 54 R s 6 9 12 18 24 26 27 27 T able 1: The saturated-throughput matrix in Mbps. set R f = { min R f : R f ≥ R a } , which is the maximum rate that is re q uired by the applica tion (we dis c uss the implications o f this choice later ). O ur key obser v a tions are summarized b elow: • Rate adaptation algo rithms p erform p o orly on high-quality links due to the long times that they incur for conv e rgi ng to the appro- priate high rate. • On lossless l inks, the fixed rate R f is b etter, while ra te adaptat ion is b eneficial on lossy links. W e defer defining what co nstitute lossless or lossy links to later ; conceptually , we consider lossles s links to be those links that can achiev e higher lo ng-term thr ough- puts using a fixed transmission r ate R f , ra ther than by applying rate adaptatio n. 4.1.1 Sing le-hop Configurations Our exp eriments with one-ho p connectivit y inv olve 80 sets o f sender- receiver pa irs and one jammer per pair. W e imp ose tha t a jammer interferes with one link a t a time and that the legitimate da ta links do not interfere with ea c h other . Thus, we pe r form 2 0 different sets o f exp erimen ts, with 4 isolated data links and 4 jammers in each exp eriment. Rate adaptation consumes a significant part of the jamme r’s slee p ti me, to conv erge to the ap- propriate rate: As so on as the jammer “go es to sleep”, the link quality improv es and thus, the rate con trol algo- rithm sta r ts increasing the ra te pr ogressively . How ever, since the purp ose of a jamming attack is to co rrupt a s many transmis s ions as p ossible, the jammer will typi- cally not sleep for a long time. In such a case , the sleep duration of the jammer will not b e enoug h for the r ate control to reach the highest rate p ossible. T o illustrate this we cho o se tw o links on our tes tbed, one that can sup- po rt 12 Mbps a nd the other that ca n suppo r t 54 Mbps. Figure 2 depicts the results. W e observe that (a) irr e- sp ectiv e of whether SampleRate or a fixed r ate strateg y is used, during jamming the thro ughput dro ps to v alues close to zero since the jammer blo cks the medium for the sender, and (b) the thr oughput achieve d with SampleR- ate is quite low, and much lower than if we fix the r ate to the c onstant value of 12 Mbps. Note that we hav e observed the sa me b ehavior with AMRR and Ono e. Fixed rate assignment outp erforms rate adap- tation on lossl ess links: As alluded to ab ov e, in o rder to find the b est rate on a link after the impact of a jam- mer, the r ate adaptation mechanisms gradually increase the r ate, inv oking transmissio ns at all the low e r rates int erim, until the b e st ra te is r eac hed. F or links that can inheren tly suppo rt high rates, this pro cess might consume the sleep pe r iod o f the ja mmer (as sug g ested by the res ults in Figure 2 ). If the b est ra te for a link was known a prior i, at the instance that the jammer go es to sleep, transmissions may be in vok ed at tha t r ate. This would utilize the s le e p p erio d of the jammer more effectively . As observed in Figur e 3, the throughputs achiev ed with fixed rate ass ignmen t ar e m uch higher than those a c hieved w ith rate adaptation on s uc h links . Determining the right tr ansmission r ate p olicy: Implic ations of setting R f = { m i n R f : R f ≥ R a } : Since the application do es not require the link to sus ta in a higher rate, the highest throughput for that a pplica- tion rate is rea c hed either with this c ho ice of R f or with some rate that is low er than R a . If the rate adaptatio n algorithm conv erges to a r ate that results in a thr o ugh- put that is higher than with the chosen R f , then the adaptive rate stra tegy should b e used. If instead, during the jammer’s sleep per iod, the ra te adaptation technique is unable to conv erg e to such a r ate, the fixe d rate strat- egy is be tter. Analy tic al ly determining t he right ra t e: In order to de- termine whether it is b etter to use a fixed or an adaptiv e- rate a pproach for a g iv en link, we p erform a n analysis based on the following pa rameters: 1. The distr ibutio n of the jammer’s a ctiv e and sleep per iods (we call this the jammer’s distribution ). 2. The applica tio n data ra te, R a . 3. The p erformance metric o n the considered legiti- mate link, i.e., PDR, link throughput, etc. 4. The rate ada ptation scheme that is employed, i.e., Ono e, SampleRate, etc. The key scheme-specific factor is the transitio n time from a low er r a te to the next higher ra te, under conducive conditions. 5. The effe ctiveness of the jammer F , measured by the achiev able throug hput while the jammer is on. The low er the throughput, the more effective the jammer. Let us supp ose tha t the exp ected s le eping duration o f the jammer during a cyc le , is g iv en by E [ t s ] a nd the exp ected p erio d for which it is active, by E [ t j ]. The ex- pec ted dur a tion of a cycle is then E [ t s ] + E [ t j ]. As an example, if the jammer picks its sleeping p erio d fro m a uniform distribution U [ a, b ] and its jamming per iod from U [ c, d ], E [ t s ] and E [ t j ] ar e equa l to b + a 2 and d + c 2 , resp ec- tively . F or simplicity let us as s ume tha t the link-quality metric emplo yed 5 is the PDR. With application data rate R a and fixe d transmission rate R f , the through- put achiev ed during a jammer’s cyc le is: T f ixed = E [ t s ] E [ t s ] + E [ t j ] · P D R f · R s + E [ t j ] E [ t s ] + E [ t j ] · F, (1) 5 Our analysis can b e mo d ified to adopt an y other link-qualit y metric. 5 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Throughput (Mbps) Time (sec) Fixed rate 12Mbps Sample rate 12Mbps 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Throughput (Mbps) Time (sec) Fixed rate 54Mbps Sample rate 54Mbps Figure 2: Rate adaptation algo ri thms ma y not find the b est rate during the slee p p erio d of the jammer. W e sho w cases for 2 different links, one with R a = 1 2 Mbps (l eft) and one with R a = 5 4 Mbps (ri gh t). 0 5 10 15 20 25 54 48 36 24 18 12 9 6 Average Throughput (Mbps) Rate(Mbps) Fixed Rate Sample Rate AMRR ONOE Figure 3: Fixed rates outp er- form rate adaptation for high- qualit y li nks, under random jam- ming. ( R a = R f ) where P D R f is the PDR of the link at r ate R f . Recall that the rate achieved in practice with a sp ecified r a te R f is R s . T o co mpute the throug hput with r ate adaptation , we pro ceed a s follows. Let us a ssume that x ( F , R s ) corr e- sp onds to the convergence time o f the rate ada ptation algorithm (sp ecific to the chosen algorithm). W e con- sider the following t wo cases. 1) x ( F, R s ) < E [ t s ] . This case holds when the jam- mer’s sleep dur ation is sufficien t (o n average) for the rate control algo rithm to conv er ge to the b est r ate R s . In this scenario, the achiev able thro ughput is: T adapt = [ E [ t s ] − x ( R s )] · R s + X R i y ( R i ) · R i + E [ t j ] · F E [ t s ] + E [ t j ] , where R i ∈ S , S b eing the set of a ll intermediate rates from F to R s . y ( R i ) is the time that the rate control al- gorithm spends at the co rresp onding rate R i . The v a lues of y ( R i ) a re sp ecific to the implementation of the r ate control algo rithm. Note that x ( F, R s ) can b e easily com- puted fr om y ( R i ) b y adding all the individual durations for the rates b elonging to the set S . 2) x ( F , R s ) ≥ E [ t s ] . In this scenario, the average sleep time o f the jammer is insufficient for the r ate control algorithm to conv e rge to the desire d r ate. When the jammer wak e s up, the r a te will aga in drop to low er levels due to increased interference. Here, the throughput that can b e achiev ed during a jammer’s cycle is : T adapt = n X i =1 y ( R i ) · R i + " E [ t s ] − n X i =1 y ( R i ) # · R n +1 + E [ t j ] · F E [ t s ] + E [ t j ] where n = max { k : k X i =1 y ( R i ) ≤ E [ t s ] } . Based on the ab o ve analys is , we define a link to b e lossy , when T f ixed ≤ T adapt ; the links on whic h T f ixed > T adapt are class ified as loss less links. C le arly for lo ssy links it is better to use the rate adaptation algor ithm. The analysis can b e used to compute P D R T H f , a thresh- old v alue of P D R f below which, a rate adaptatio n stra t- egy p erforms b etter tha n the fixed rate a pproach. In particular, by setting T f ixed = T adapt and so lving this equation, one can co mpute P D R T H f . Based on this, a decision can b e ma de on whether to enable rate a dapta- tion or use fix ed-rate a s signmen t. If the observed PDR is la r ger than the computed thr e s hold, fixed rate sho uld be used; otherwis e, rate adaptation sho uld b e used. V alidation of o ur analysi s : In o r der to v alidate our analysis, we measure P D R T H f on 80 different links in the presence of a bala nced jammer. W e then com- pare them aga inst the P D R T H f v a lues co mputed with our analysis. Note here that the analysis itself dep ends on meas ur ed v alues o f cer tain quantities (such a s the jammer distributio n and the function y ( R i )). In this exp erimen t, we consider the SampleRate algorithm, and measure the v alues of x ( F, R s ) and y ( R i ). The jammer’s sleep time follows U [0 , 4 ] and the jamming time follows U [1 , 6]. Figure 4 plots the v alues of function y for differ- ent v alues of R f . In T a ble 2, we compar e the theoretica lly computed PDR thresholds with the ones measured o n our testbed, for v a rious v alues of R f . W e obser v e that the P D R f thresholds computed with our analy sis a re very similar to the o nes measured on our testb ed. Ther e ar e slight discrepancies since our analysis is based on using mea- sured average v alues which may change to so me extent ov er time. W e wish to s tress that while we verify our analysis a ssuming tha t the ja mmer is active and idle for uniformly distributed p erio ds of time, our a nalysis de- pends only on exp ected v alues and is there fo re v alid for other jammer distributions . Finally , Fig ure 5 shows the adv antage of using a fixed r ate approa c h ov er SampleR- ate for v ar ious PDR v alues and with R f = 5 4 Mbps. W e observe that SampleRate pro v ides higher throughputs only for very low PDR v alues . Next, w e consider tw o extreme ca ses of jamming: fre- quent and rare jammers (see section 3). The distribu- tions tha t we use in our exp erimen ts for these jammer s are shown in T able 3. Note that by choosing the jam- mer’s sleeping and jamming time from distr ibutions lik e the one o f the frequen t jammer, we essentially co nstruct a constant ja mmer . With frequent jammers, the differ- 6 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Rate (Mbps) Time(sec) 6Mbps 9Mbps 12Mbps 18Mbps 24Mbps 36Mbps 48Mbps 54Mbps Figure 4: Measured con ver- gence times of the MadWifi SampleRate algorithm, for the different application data rates. -5 0 5 10 15 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Throughput gain (Mbps) PDR Figure 5: Throughput gain of fixed rate Vs. SampleR- ate, for v arious li nk qualities and for application data rate of 54 Mbps. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 54 48 36 24 18 12 9 6 Average Throughput (Mbps) Rate(Mbps) Fixed Rate Sample Rate Figure 6: The p erformance with rare jammers is aligne d with our observ ations for the case with balanced jamm e rs. ( R a = R f ) R f Measured P D R T H f Analytical P D R T H f 6 0.82 0.83 9 0.52 0.55 12 0.40 0.41 18 0.26 0.27 24 0.19 0.21 36 0.19 0.20 48 0.17 0.185 54 0.15 0.185 T able 2: P D R f thresholds ence in the p erformance b e t ween fixed r a te assignment and rate adaptation is lar ger, while for a rar e jammer it is s maller. This is b ecause with r are jamming, rate adaptation will hav e more time to conv erg e and there- fore often succeeds in achieving the highest rate pos s ible; one obser ves the opp osite effect when we ha ve a frequent jammer. The res ults ar e plotted in Figur es 6 a nd 7. - Sleep time (sec) Jamming time (sec) Balanced U[1,8] U[1,5] Rare U[1,5] U[1,2] F requent U[1,2] U[1,15] T able 3: The jamming distributi ons that we use in our exp eriments. 4.1.2 Ra ndom J amming in Multi-hop T opologies Next, w e examine the impact of a ra ndo m ja mmer on the end-to- end throug hput o f a multi-hop pa th. W e e x - per imen t with 15 different r outes on our testb ed. W e fix static routes o f v a rious lengths (from 2 to 4 links per route) utilizing the r oute Unix to ol in o rder to mo dify the routing tables of no des. W e place a jammer such that it affects one o r mo r e links. Along each r oute, links that a re no t a ffected by the jammer consistently use a rate adapta tio n algor ithm. On the links that ar e su b- je ct to jamming, our analysis dictates the de cision on whether to use fix e d or adaptive r ate assignment. W e measure the end-to-end thro ughput on the route. W e show our results for routes on which, in the absence of a jammer, end- to-end throughputs of 6 and 12 Mbps were observed. F rom Figur e 8 we see that the b ehavior with r ate adaptation on multi-hop r outes, in the pr esenc e of a r andom jammer, is t he same as that on a single-hop link . In particula r , with low da ta r ates, a s ufficien tly high PDR has to b e sustained ov er the r oute, in order for a fixed ra te appr oach to p erform b etter than rate adaptation. On the o ther ha nd, when r outes s upport high data rates, fixing the rate on the individual links (that are affected by the jammer) as p e r o ur a nalytical framework, provides higher benefits. Cho osing the righ t p ol icy in practice: T o sum- marize our findings, our analys is demonstra tes that us- ing a fixed rate may b e attractive on loss less links while it w o uld b e b etter to use rate adaptation o n loss y links. How ever, as discussed, determining when to use o ne ov er the other in rea l time during system o p erations is difficult; the deter mina tion requires the knowledge of x ( F, R s ), y ( R i ) and estimates of how o ften the jammer is active/asleep, on av e r age. Thus, we cho o se a s impler practical appro ac h that w e call MRC for Marko vian Rate Control. W e will des c r ibe MR C in detail later (in s ection 5) but in a nutshell, MRC induces memory in to the s y s- tem and keeps track of the feas ible ra tes during b enign jamming-free perio ds; as so on as the jammer goes to sleep, legitima te tr ansmissions a re inv oked at the most recent ra te used during the previous sleeping cyc le of the jammer. W e also p erform offline mea s uremen ts by di- rectly using our a nalytical formulation (with knowledge of the afore mentioned par ameters); these measurements serve a s b enchmarks for ev aluating the efficacy of MRC (discussed in section 6). 4.2 P erformance of Po wer Contr ol in the Pr es- ence of Random Jamming Next, we examine whether tuning power le vels ca n help cop e with the interference injected by a jammer. If we consider a s ingle legitimate da ta link and a jam- mer, incr emen ting the tra nsmission p ow er on the data link should increas e the SINR (signal- to-in ter ference plus noise ra tio) o f the received data pa c kets. Thus, one could argue that increa s ing the transmission p ow er is always bene fic ia l in jamming en vironments [18]. W e v a ry the transmissio n p ow ers of b oth the jammer and leg itima te transce iv er , as well as the CCA threshold 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 54 48 36 24 18 12 9 6 Average Throughput (Mbps) Rate(Mbps) Fixed Rate Sample Rate Figure 7: Fixed rate im- pro ves the p erformance more than rate adaptation at high rates, wi th frequen t jam- mers. ( R a = R f ) 0 1 2 3 4 5 12 6 Average Throughput (Mbps) Rate(Mbps) Fixed Rate Sample Rate Figure 8: Rate adaptation presen ts the same b ehav ior in m ul tihop l inks; it pro- vides lo wer throughput at high rates. 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 (18,5) (18,18) Throughput (%) sustained (P L dBm,P J dBm) 6Mbps 54Mbps Figure 9: Perc en tage of the isolated throughput, for v ar- ious P L and P J com bi nations, for tw o differen t transm i s- sion rates. of the latter. Note that the jammer’s transmis sion dis- tribution is not very r elev ant in this par t of our s tudy . Our exp ectation is that tuning the p o wer of legitimate transceivers will pro v ide b enefits while the jammer is active. In other wor ds, one c an exp e ct that the b enefits fr om p ower c ontr ol wil l b e similar with any typ e of jammer. W e define the following: • RS S I T R : The RSSI of the signal of the legitimate transmitter at its receiver. • RS S I RT : The RSSI o f the signal in the r e v er s e direction (the r e c eiv er is now the tra nsmitter). • RS S I J T and RS S I J R : T he RSSI v alues of the jamming sig nal at the leg itimate transmitter and receiver, res p ectively . • RS S I J : The minimum of { R S S I J T , RS S I J R } . • P L and C C A L : The trans mission p ow er and the CCA threshold at leg itimate trans ceiv er s. • P J : The transmission p ow er of the jammer. Our main obser v ations are the following: • Mitig ating jamming effects by i ncremen ting P L is viable at l o w data rates. It is extremely difficult to ov e rcome the jamming in terfer- ence at high rates, simply with p ower adap- tation . • Increasing C C A L restores (in m ost cases) the isolated throughput (the throughput achiev ed in the absen ce of jamm ers). W e presen t o ur exp erimen ts and the interpretations thereo f, in what follows. 4.2.1 Increasing P L to co pe with jamming interfer- ence Increasing P L will incr ease the SINR a nd one might exp ect that this would r educe the impact of jamming int erference on the thro ughput. In our exp erimen ts we quantify the gains from employing suc h a “brute-fo rce” approach. Details on the exp erimental pr o c ess: W e per fo rm measurements on 80 different links a nd with 4 jammers. W e consider different fixed v a lue s for P J (from 1 dBm to 1 8 dBm). F o r each of these v alues we v ary P L be- t ween 1 and 18 dBm and obser v e the throug hput in the presence of the jammer, for all p ossible fixed tra nsmis- sion rates . F or each chosen pair o f v alues { P L , P J } , we run 60-minute r epeated exp eriments a nd collect a new throughput mea suremen t once every 0.5 seconds. Both end-no des of a legitimate link use the same transmission power. The combination of high P L and l ow data rate helps mitigate the i mpact o f low-p ow er jammers. W e ex periment with many different loc a tions of the jam- mers. Our measurements indicate that when high trans- mission rates a re used, increasing P L do es not help al- leviate the impact of jammer s. Sample results ar e de- picted in Figure 9. In this figur e , we plo t the p ercentage of the iso lated throughput a c hieved in the presence of jamming, for t wo r e pr esen ta tiv e co m binations of P L and P J and for 2 different rates. In our exp erimen ts on the 80 considered links, ther e wer e no links wher e incr ement- ing P L incr e ase d the thr oughput at high data r ates, even with very low jamming p owers. While there could ex- ist cas e s wher e incrementing P L could yield b enefits a t high rates, this was not o bserved. In contrast, we ob- serve that with lo w data ra tes and when P J is low, data links can ov er come jamming to a large extent b y increa s- ing P L . Figure 10 depicts a nother r epresent ative subset of o ur meas uremen t results where all legitimate no des use P L =18 dBm, while P J is v a ried b et w een 1 a nd 18 dBm. W e observe that the combination of high P L with low da ta r ate helps overcome the impa ct of jamming, when P J is low. Note a lso that when P J is high, it is extremely difficult to achieve high av er age throughput. The a b ov e obse rv ations can b e explained by taking a careful lo ok at the following tw o ca s es: Str ong jammer : Let us cons ider a jammer s uc h that RS S I J > C C A L . This can result in tw o effects: (a) The sender will sens e that the medium is constantly busy and will defer its pa c ket tr ansmissions for pro lo nged per iods of time. (b) The signals of bo th the sender and the jam- 8 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Throughput (%) P J (dBm) 6 Mbps 9 Mbps 12 Mbps 18 Mbps 24 Mbps 36 Mbps 48 Mbps 54 Mbps Figure 10: P e rcen tage of the isolated throughput in the presence of a balanced jam- mer for v arious P J and P J v alues and data rates. Figure 11: P e rcen tage of the isolated throughput in the presence of a balanc ed jam- mer Vs. RS S I J , for C C A L = –80 dBm. Figure 1 2: P ercen tage of the isolated throughput, for v ar- ious R S S I J v alues , and for C C A L = – 50 dBm. 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 -80 -75 -70 -65 -60 -55 -50 -45 -40 Throughput (%) CCA(dBm) P L 20dBm P L 15dBm P L 10dBm P L 05dBm Figure 1 3: P ercen tage of the isolated throughput, for v ari- ous C C A L v alues and v arious P L v alues . P J = 2 0 dBm. 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 -40 -80 Throughput (%) CCA(dBm) Figure 14: Careful CCA adaptation significant ly improv es the end-to-end throughput along a route. 0 5 10 15 20 25 54 48 36 24 18 12 9 6 Average Throughput (Mbps) Rate(Mbps) Fixed Rate Sample Rate MRC with K=3 MRC with K=30 Figure 15: MR C outp er- forms curren t rate adapta- tion algorithms, esp ecially for hi gh v al ue s of K . mer will arrive at the re ceiv er with RSSI v alues higher than C C A L . This will result in a pa c ket co llision at the receiver. In bo th case s, the throughput is degraded. Our measurements show that it is not p ossible to miti- gate str ong jammers simply by incr e asing P L . We ak jammer : Let us supp ose that the jammer’s signals ar riv e with low RSSI at legitimate no des. This may b e either due to energ y-conserv ation strategie s im- plement ed by the jammer causing it to use low P J (e.g., 2 dBm), or due to p oo r ch annel conditions betw een a ja m- mer a nd a legitimate transceiver. At high transmissio n rates, the SINR required for the succes sful deco ding o f a pack et is larger than what is re q uired at low rates (shown in T a ble 4) [11]. Our throughput measurements show that even in the presence o f weak ja mmers, the SINR requirements a t high tra nsmission rates are typically not satisfied. How ever, since the SINR requirements at low er data rates ar e less stringent, the c ombination of high P L and low r ate, pr ovides signific ant thr oughput b enefit s . Data Rate 6 9 12 18 24 3 6 4 8 54 SINR (dB) 6 7.8 9 10.8 17 18.8 24 24.6 T able 4: SINR le vels required for successful pac k et deco ding, in 802. 1 1a/g. 4.2.2 T uning C C A L on single-hop settings Next, we in vestigate the potential of a djusting C C A L in conjunction with P L . Implementation and exp erimental details: F or these exp eriments we exclusively use the Intel-2915 cards; these ca rds allow us to tune the CCA thr eshold. W e ha ve mo dified a prototype version of the AP/client driver, in order to p erio dically collect measurements for R S S I T R , RS S I RT and R S S I J . W e c onsider 80 AP-clie nt data links, with traffic flowing from the AP to the client. As befo re, we divide the 80 data link s into 20 sets o f 4 iso - lated links. W e use Intel’s proprie tary rate adaptation algorithm, which has been implemented in the firmw a re of the Intel-2915 car ds. W e measure the achieved data throughput for different v alues of P L and C C A L . B oth no des of a data link use the same p o wer and CCA thre sh- old v a lues. T uning the CCA thres h o ld is a p oten ti al jam- ming m itigation tec hnique. T o b egin with, we p er- form throughput mea suremen ts with the default C C A L v a lue (-80 dBm), a nd with v a rious RS S I J v a lues. W e observe from Figure 11 that when R S S I J < C C A L , data links a chieve high thro ughputs. This is b ecause signa ls with RSSI < C C A L are ignored by the tr ansceiver’s hardware. In par ticular, (a) such signals do not r en- der the medium busy , and (b) r e ceiv er s are trying to latch onto signa ls with RSSI > C C A L , while other sig - nals are co nsidered to b e background no ise. Moreov er , even when R S S I J is slightly lar ger than C C A L , we still observe decent thr oughput achiev ements for the ca ses wherein da ta links op erate at high SINR regimes. These measurements imply that the ability to tune C C A L can 9 help receive data pack e ts correctly , even while jammer s are active. In order to further ex plo re the p otential of s uch an approach, we v a r y C C A L from - 75 to -30 dBm on ea c h of the considered 80 links. Figure 12 depicts the re- sults for the ca se where C C A L is eq ual to -50 dBm.W e observe that i ncr e asing C C A L r esults i n signifi- c antly higher data thr oughputs, even wi th quite high RS S I J values. Mo re sp ecifically , from Figure 12 we obser v e that when R S S I J is low er than C C A L , links can a c hieve up to 9 5% of the throughput that is achiev ed when the link op erates in isolatio n (jamming- free). When R S S I J ≈ C C A L , data links still achiev e up to 7 0% of the jamming-free throughput (capture of data packet s is still p ossible to a sig nifican t e x ten t). As one might exp ect, if R S S I J ≫ C C A L , there ar e no p er- formance b enefits. Our observ atio ns also hold in some scenar io s where, P J > P L . Figure 1 3 pr esen ts the results fr om o ne such scenario. W e obser v e that appropriate CCA settings can allow legitimate no des to exchange tra ffic effectiv ely , even when P J ≫ P L . This is p ossible if the link co ndi- tions b et ween the jammer and the leg itima te transceivers are po or and result in low R S S I J . Note here that one cannot incr ease C C A L to ar bitrarily high v a lues on le - gitimate no des. Doing so is likely to compromise con- nectivity b etw een no des or degrade the thro ughput due to failure o f ca pturing pa ckets as seen in Figure 13 for P L = 5 dB m a nd P L = 1 0 dB m . 4.2.3 T uning C C A L in multi-hop configu rati ons W e p erform exp eriments with v ar ious CCA thresholds along a ro ute. Prev io us studies ha ve shown that in order to av oid s tarv a tio n due to asymmetric links, the trans- mission p ow er and the CCA threshold need to b e jointly tuned for all no des of the same co nnec ted (sub)net work [11]. In particula r, the pro duct C = P L · C C A L m ust be the sa me for a ll no des. Given this, we ensure that C is the sa me for all no des that a re par t of a route. In particular, we set P L to b e equal to the maximum p os- sible v alue of 20 dBm on a ll no des of a r oute; for ea c h run, C C A L is therefore set to b e the same on all of the no des on the route. Thr oughout o ur ex p eriments with m ulti-hop tra ffic, no des on one ro ute do not in terfere with no des that are on other routes. In scena rios where no des b elonging to different routes interfere with each other, if all no des use the s a me P L , their C C A L v a lues m ust b e the sa me [11], [29]. How ever, we did not ex- per imen t with such scenarios given that our ob jective is to isolate the impact of a jammer and not to examine int erference b et ween co existing sessions in a netw ork . W e exp eriment with the sa me mu lti-hop settings a s in section 4.1.2. Figure 1 4 pre sen ts the results observed on one o f our routes. W e observe tha t careful CCA tuning can provide significa nt av e r age end-to -end throughput bene fits alo ng a route. 5. DESIGNING ARES In this section, we design our system ARES based on the o bserv a tions fro m the previo us section. ARES is comp osed of tw o main mo dules: (a) a ra te mo dule that decides b etw een fix e d or adaptive-rate assignment, and (b) a p ower c ontr ol mo dule that facilitates appropr iate CCA tuning on legitimate no des. Rate Mo dule i n AR ES: As discuss ed in section 4.1, our exp eriments with three p opular r ate a daptation al- gorithms show that the conv er gence time of the a lgo- rithms affects the link p erformance in r andom-jamming environmen ts. This conv e r gence time is large ly imple- men tation sp ecific. As an example, our exp erimen ts with bo th SampleRate and O noe s ho w that in many cases it takes more tha n 10 sec for b oth algorithms to co n verge to the “b est” rate; [30 ] re p orts similar obser v ations . The rate mo dule in ARES decides on whether a fixed o r a n adaptive-rate a ppr oach should be applied. MR C: Markovian R ate Contr ol: MRC is an algorithm– patch that can b e implemented o n top of any rate con- trol algo rithm. MRC is motiv ated by our analys is in section 4. How ever, as discusse d earlier, it do es not di- rectly apply the analysis, since this would r equire exten- sive offline measurements (the co llection of which can b e time-consuming) and es timates of the jammer active and sleep p eriods . The key idea that drives MRC is that a rate adaptation algor ithm need not examine the p erfor- mance a t a ll the tra ns mission ra tes during the sleeping per iod o f the ja mmer . The algorithm simply needs to re- mem ber the previously used tra nsmission rate, and use it a s so on a s the jammer goes to sleep. Simply put , MR C in tro duces m emory in to the s ystem. The system keeps tr ac k of past tra nsmission rates and ho ps to the stored highe s t-rate state as so on as the jammer go es to sleep. Since the c hannel conditions may also change due to the v ariability in the environmen t, MRC inv o k es the re-scanning of all r a tes p erio dically , once every K con- secutive sleeping/ jamming cycles . When K = 1 we do not exp ect to hav e any b enefits, since the scanning takes place in each cyc le . Note here that the appro priate v a lue of K dep ends on the en v ir onmen t and the sleep and active pe r iods of the jammer. O ne could ada ptiv ely tune the K v alue. As an example, an a dditiv e incr ease a dditiv e dec r ease strategy may b e used whe r e one would increase the v a lue of K un til a degrada tion is seen. The K v alue would then be decre a sed. The implementation of such a strategy is beyond the scop e of this pap e r a nd will be co nsidered in the future. Implementation details of MRC : The implement ation (a) keeps tra c k of the highest transmiss ion ra te used o ver a b enign time p erio d (when the jammer is asleep) and, (b) applies this rate immediately up on the detection of the next transition fro m the jammer’s active pe riod to the sleeping p erio d. Figure 15 pr esen ts a set o f mea suremen ts with MRC, with in termittent SampleRate in vo cations (o nce every K cycles) for K = { 3 , 30 } . W e obser v e that MRC outp er- forms pur e SampleRate in jamming environments, es- 10 pec ially with larger v alues of K . With small K , the rate adaptatio n algorithm is inv oked often and this re- duces the ach ieved b enefits. F urthermo re, MR C pro- vides thro ughput that is clo se to the maximum achiev- able on the link (whic h ma y be either with fixed or adap- tive rate, dep ending o n whether the link is lossy or loss- less). P ow er Control Mo dule in ARES: As dis cussed in section 4.2, increasing P L is b eneficial at low ra tes; while at high r ates this is not particularly useful, it do es not hu rt either. Since our goa l in this pap er is to prop ose metho ds for ov er c oming the effects of jamming (and no t legitimate) interference, w e imp o se the use of the max i- m um P L by all no des in the presence o f ja mmers. The design of a p o wer control mechanism that in a dditio n takes into a ccoun t the imp osed legitimate interference (due to high P L ) is b eyond the scop e of this pap er. More significan tly , our p ow er cont rol mo dule o ver- comes jamming int erference by adaptively tuning C C A L . The mo dule requires the following inputs on each link: • The v alues of RS S I T R , RS S I RT , RS S I J R , and RS S I J T . These v alues ca n b e eas ily o bserved in real time. • An estimation for the shadow fading v a riation o f the channel, ∆. Due to shadow fading, the a bov e RSSI v a lues ca n o ccasionally v ary b y ∆. The v alue of ∆ is dependent on the environment o f deploy- men t. One can p erform o ffline measure ments and configure the v alue of ∆ in ARES. W e deter mine the v ariations in RSSI measurements via exp erimen ts on a la rge set o f links. The measurements indicate that ∆ is approximately 5 dB for our testb ed (a less conserv ative v alue than w ha t is rep orted in [31]). The v alue of C C A L has to b e at least ∆ dB lower than bo th RS S I T R and R S S I RT , to g ua rant ee connectiv ity at all times. Hence, ARES s ets: C C A L = min ( R S S I T R , RS S I RT ) − ∆ , if max ( RS S I J T ,R S S I J R ) ≤ min ( RS S I T R ,R S S I RT ) − ∆ . Otherwise, C C A L is not changed 6 . This ens ures that le- gitimate no de s ar e a lways c onnected, while the ja mmer’s signal is ignor ed to the ex ten t p ossible. Our exp erimen ts indicate that, esp ecially if max ( RS S I J T ,R S S I J R ) ≤ min ( RS S I T R ,R S S I RT ) − 2∆ , the data link can op erate as if it is jamming-free. In order to avoid starv ation effects, the tuning o f the CCA threshold s hould b e p erformed only when no des that participate in pow er con trol belong to the same net work [29]. Unless collo cated netw orks c o op erate in joint ly tuning their CCA (as per our sch eme), our p o wer control mo dule will not b e used. Note that when jam- ming attacks b ecome mo r e prev a le n t, co oper ation b e- t ween co existing netw orks may b e ess e n tial in or der to 6 W e c ho ose not to tune C C A L , unless we are certain th at it can help alleviate jamming interference. fight the attack er s. Hence, in such cases collo cated net- works ca n have an ag r eemen t to join tly increase the CCA thresholds when there is a jammer. Implementation details: Our p ow er control algo- rithm can b e applied in a centralized manner by having all leg itimate no des r e port the r equired RSSI v alues to a central ser v er . The central server then applies the same C C A L v a lue to all no des (of the same connected net- work). The chosen C C A L is the highest p ossible CCA threshold that guar an tees connectivit y betw een le g iti- mate no des. This repo rting requires trivia l mo difications on the wir eless drivers. W e hav e implemented a central- ized functionality when our netw ork is configured as a m ulti-hop wireless mesh. In a distributed s etting, our algor ithm is applicable as long as legitimate no des are able to e x c hang e RSSI information. Each no de can then independently deter- mine the C C A L v a lue. T o demonstrate its via bilit y , we implemen t and tes t a distr ibuted version o f the p ow er control mo dule in a 80 2.11a/g WLAN configur ation. In particular, we mo dify the Intel pro tot yp e AP driver, by adding an extr a field in the “Beacon” template. This new field contains a matrix of RSSI v alues of neigh b oring jammers and legitimate no des. W e enable the deco ding of rec e iv ed b eacons in the AP dr iv er (they do not read these by default). Assuming that a jammer imp oses al- most the same amount of interference on all devices (AP and clients) within a cell, the AP of the cell determines the fina l C C A L after a series o f iter ations in a manner very simila r to the approaches in [29], [11]. Com bining the mo dules to form ARES: W e com- bine our ra te and p ow er control mo dules to constr uct ARES as s hown in Figur e 16. ARES also includes a jamming detection functionality . T owards this we in- corp orate a mechanism that was prop osed in [15]; this functionality p erforms a consis tency chec k b et ween the instantaneous PDR and RSSI v alues. If the P DR is ex- tremely low while the RSSI is m uch higher than the de- fault C C A L , the no de is c o nsidered to b e jammed. The goal of ARES is to detect jammers a nd apply the individual mo dules as a ppr opriate. ARES applies the power co n trol mo dule first, since with this mo dule, the impact of the jammer(s) co uld b e completely ov er c ome. If the rece iver is able to captur e and deco de a ll pack ets in s pite of the jammer’s tra nsmissions, no further ac- tions a r e r equired. Note that even if C C A L > R S S I J , the jammer ca n still affect the link p erformance. This is b ecause with CCA tuning the jamming signal’s p ow er is added to the noise p ow er . Hence, even though the throughput may increas e , the link may no t achieve the “jamming-free per formance” while the jammer is active. If the jammer still has an effect on the netw or k per- formance after tuning C C A L , (or if CCA tuning is in- feasible due to the pres ence of collo cated uncoo pera tive net works) ARES enables the ra te module. Note that the t wo mo dules can op erate indepe ndently and the sy s tem can bypass any of them in case the ha rdw a re/softw are do es no t suppo rt the spe c ific functionality . 11 C > Δ ? CCA = B - Δ CCA Unchanged no OR Po w e r C o n tr o l Mo d u l e 3 4 6 5 C C A tunable ? no ST ART A = max (RSSI JT , RSSI JR ) B = min (RSSI RT , RSSI TR ) C = B - A Jammers detected ? MRC R a te C o n tr o l Mo d u l e CCA RA TE 8 END 9 I s j a mmi n g completely overcome? 7 no Pre se nce of uncooperative networks ? 1 yes no yes yes 2 yes Figure 16: ARES: our An ti-jamm ing Reinforcem e n t System. 6. EV ALU A TING OUR SYSTE M W e first ev a lua te ARES by examining its p erformance in three different net works: a MIMO-bas ed WLAN, a mesh netw ork in the presence of mobile- jammers, and an 802.11 a WLAN se tting where uplink TCP tr affic is considered. ARES b o osts the throughput of our MIMO WLAN under jamming b y as m uc h as 100%: O ur ob jective her e is tw ofold. Fir st, we seek to obs erv e and understand the b eha vio r of MIMO netw orks in the pres- ence o f jamming. Second, we wish to mea sure the ef- fectiveness of ARES in such settings. T ow a rds this, we deploy a set of 7 no des equipp e d with R alink R T2860 miniPCI cards . Exp erimental set-up: W e examine the ca se for a WLAN setting, since the R T2860 dr iv er do es not cur- rently supp ort the ad-ho c mo de of ope rations. MIMO links with Space-Time Blo ck Co des (STBC) a re exp ected to provide r obustness to signal v ariatio ns , ther eb y re- ducing the av era ge SINR that is r equired for achieving a des ir ed bit er ror rate, a s compare d to a corres ponding SISO (Single-Input Sing le-output) link. W e mo dify the client driver of the car ds to enable 2 × 2 STB C supp ort. This inv olves a dding the line { "HtS tbc", Set HtStbc Pr oc } int o the R TMP PRIV A TE SUPPOR T PROC struct ar- ray , lo cated in os/li nux/sta ioctl. c in the driver. W e consider 2 APs , with 2 and 3 clients ea c h, and tw o jam- mers. F ully-satur a ted downlink UDP tr affic flows fro m each AP to its client s. Applying ARES on a MIMO-b ase d WLAN: W e first run exp erimen ts without enabling ARES. Interest- ingly , we o bserve that in s pite o f the fact that STB C is used, 802.11 n links present the sa me vulnera bilities as 802 .1 1a o r g links. In o ther words, MIMO do es not offer significa nt b enefits b y itself, in the prese nc e of a jammer. This is due to the fact that 8 02.11n is still employing CSMA/CA a nd as a result the jamming sig- nals ca n render the medium busy for a MIMO no de a s well. Mor eo ver, for STBC co des to work effectiv ely and provide a reduction in the SINR for a desired bit er- ror rate (BER), the sig nals received on the t wo antenna elements will hav e to exper ience indep endent multipath fading effects. In other words, a line of sight or dominant path must b e absent. How ever, in our indo or testb ed, given the pro ximit y of the comm unicating transceiver pair, this may not b e the case. Thus, little diversity is achieved [3 2] a nd do es not suffice in c oping with the jamming effects. Next, w e apply ARES and observe the behavior. The path that ARES follows (in Fig ure 16) is 1 → 5 → 7 → 8 → 9. Since the CCA thresho ld is not tunable with the R T2860 cards, ARES derives decisions with reg a rds to rate control o nly . Figure 17 depicts the r esults. W e observe that the config ur ation with ARES outp e r forms the rate adapta tion scheme that is implemented on the R T2860 car ds in the presence of the jammer , by a s m uch as 100%. Note that higher g ains would b e p ossible, if ARES was able to inv oke the p o wer co n tro l mo dule. In Figure 1 7 we also c o mpare the throughput with MR C aga inst the sug gested settings with our ana lysis (these s ettings allow us to obtain b ench mark mea sure- men ts po ssible with glo bal information). The param- eters input to the analysis are the following: (a) The jammer is ba lanced with a jamming distribution U [1 , 5] and a sleep distribution U [1 , 6 ]. (b) W e exa mine 4 R a v a lues: 13.5, 27 , 40.5 , 54 Mbps. (c) F = 0 Mbps. (d) W e input estimates of the y ( R i ) v alues which are ob- tained via comprehensive offline measur emen ts. (e) The offline measured P DR f . W e obser v e tha t the p erfor- mance with MRC is quite clo se to o ur b enchmark mea- surements. Thes e results show that in spite o f having no informatio n with reg ards to the jammer distribution or the conv ergence times of the rate ada ptation algo- rithms, MRC is able to significantly help in the presence of a random jammer. ARES i ncreases the li nk throughput b y up to 150% in a mesh depl o yment with m obile jam- mers: Next, we apply ARES in a n 80 2.11a/g mes h net- work with mobile ra ndo m jammers. W e a lso conside r a freq uen t jammer (jamming distr ibution U [1 , 20] a nd sleeping distribution U [0 , 1]). The ja mmer mov es to- wards the vicinity of the legitimate no des, remains there for k sec o nds, and subs equen tly moves aw ay . F or the mobile jammer we used a laptop, equipp ed with one o f our In tel cards, and c a rried it a round. The power c on tro l mo dule is implemen ted in a centralized manner. ARES increases C C A L in order to ov er come the effects of jam- ming in ter ference, to the ex tent p ossible. In this ca se, due to the a g gressiveness of the co nsidered jammer (pro- longed jamming duration), the rate adaptation mo dule 12 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 13.5 27 40.5 54 Average Throughput (Mbps) Rate(Mbps) Benchmark Results Performance with ARES Performance without ARES Figure 17: ARES pro vides significan t throughput b enefits in a MIMO net work in the presence of jammers. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Throughput (Mbps) Time With ARES Without ARES Figure 18: ARES pro vides significan t throughput i mpro v e- men t in mobil e- jamming scenarios. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Throughput (Mbps) Time With ARES Without ARES Figure 19: ARES i m- pro ves the client-AP link throughput by 130% wi th TCP traf- fic s cenarios . 0 5 10 15 20 3 APs 2 APs 1 AP Average AP throughput (Mbps) Number of neighbor APs Without ARES With ARES Figure 20: MRC im- pro ves the through- put of nei gh b or legiti- mate devices, as com - pared to SampleRate. do es not provide any b enefits (since ra te control helps only when the jammer is sleeping). In this sce nario, ARES follows the pa th: 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 6 → 7 → 8 → 9. Figure 1 8 depicts thr oughput-time traces, with and without ARES, fo r a n arbitrar ily chosen link and k ≈ 200 . The use o f ARES tremendous ly incr e a ses the link throughput during the jamming p e riod (b y as muc h as 15 0 %). W e have observed the same b ehavior with a distributed implementation o f the p ow er cont rol module in an 802.1 1a WLAN setting. ARES improv es the total AP throughput by up to 13 0% wi th TCP traffic: Next, we a pply ARES on a 80 2.11a WLAN. F or this exp erimen t, w e use nodes equipp e d with the In tel-291 5 cards . W e consider a set- ting with 1 AP a nd 2 clients, where clients ca n sense each others’ trans missions. W e place a balanced jammer (jamming distr ibutio n U [1 , 5] and sleeping U [1 , 8]) such that all 3 leg itimate no des can s ense its presence. W e en- able fully-saturated uplink TCP tr a ffic from all clien ts to the AP (using ip erf ) and we mea sure the total through- put a t the AP , once every 0.5 sec. I n this sce na rio, ARES follows the path: 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 6 → 7 → 8 → 9. F r om Figure 19, we observe that the t otal AP thr ough- put is impr ove d by up to 130% during the p erio ds that t he jammer is active . T he b enefits are less a pparen t when the jammer is sleeping b ecause TCP’s own cong estion control algorithm is unable to fully exploit the a dv a n- tages offered by the fixe d rate strateg y . Applying MRC o n an AP improv es the through- put of neig h b or APs b y as m uc h as 23%: With MR C, a jammed no de utilizes the lo west rate (when the jammer is active) a nd hig he s t rate (when the jam- mer is s leeping) that provide the maximum long -term throughput. With this, the jammed no de avoids exam- ining the intermediate rates and, as we showed ab o ve, this increases the link throug hput. W e now examine how this ra te adaptation stra tegy a ffects the p erformance o f neighbor leg itimate no des. W e per form expe rimen ts on a top ology consisting of 4 APs and 8 clients, with 2 client s asso ciated with each AP , all s et to 80 2.11a mo de. A bal- anced jammer with a jamming distribution U [1 , 5] and a sleep distribution U [1 , 6 ] is placed such that affects only one of the APs. Only the affected AP is running MR C; the rest of the APs use SampleRate. W e activ ate different num b ers of APs at a time, a nd we enable fully- saturated downlink tra ffic from the APs to their clients. Figure 20 depicts the av er a ge total AP throughput. In- terestingly , we obser v e that the use of MRC on jamme d links impr oves t he p erformanc e of neighb or APs that ar e not even affe cte d by the jammer . This is b ecause the jammed AP do es no t send any pack e ts using intermedi- ate bit rates (such as with the default op eration of rate adaptation alg orithms). Since MRC av oids the tr ans- mission of pack ets a t low e r (that the highest s ustained) bit rates, the jammed AP do es not o ccup y the medium for as prolong ed p erio ds a s with the default ra te con- trol techniques; the tra nsmission of pa c kets at the high rate (while the jammer is a sleep) takes less time. Hence, this pr o v ides more opportunities for neighbo r APs to access the medium, thereby increas ing the AP thro ugh- put. Sp ecifically , we observe that the throughput o f one neighbor AP is impr o ved by 2 3% (when the to polog y consists of only 2 APs, one of which is jammed). As we further incre ase the num b er of neighbor APs , the ben- efits due to MRC are less pronounced, due to incr eased conten tion (Figure 20). W e elab orate of the efficacy of MR C in the following se c tion. ARES conv e rges relativ e ly quick ly: Finally , we per form exp eriments to asses s how quickly the distributed form of ARES con verges to a r ate and pow er control setting. In a nutshell, o ur implementation has demo n- strated that the net work-wide co n vergence time of ARES is relatively small. With MRC, the rate control mo dule can very rapidly make a decision with regards to the rate setting; a s so on as the jammer is detected, MR C applies the appropr iate stored low est and highest rates. With regar ds to the conv ergence o f the p ow er control mo dule, recall that our implementation involv es the dis- semination of the c o mputed CCA v alue through the p e- rio dic tr ansmission o f b eacon frames (one b eacon frame per 10 0 ms ec is transmitted with our ipw2200 driver) [29]. As one might exp e c t, the jammer’s signal may col- lide with beac o n frames, and this makes it more difficult for the pow er con tro l mo dule to c o n verge. Note also 13 that a s rep orted in [29, 33], b eacon tra ns missions are not always timely , esp ecially in conditions o f hig h load and p oo r-quality links (such as in jamming scena rios). W e mea sure the net work-wide co n vergence time, i.e., the time e la psed from the moment that we activ a te the jam- mer until all legitimate devices have adjusted their CCA threshold as p er our p ow er control scheme. First, we per form mea suremen ts o n a m ulti-hop mesh top ology consisting o f 5 AP s and 10 clients (2 clients p er AP , all equipp e d with the Intel 2915 car ds). In order to hav e an idea ab o ut whether the obser v ed conv erg ence time is sig- nificant, we also per form ex periments without jammers, wherein we manually inv oke the power control mo dule through a user-level so c ket int erface on one of the APs. W e obser ve that the conv er gence time for the sp ecific setting is approximately 1.2 sec. Then, we activ ate a de c eptive jammer in a close proximit y to 2 neighbor APs (MR C is disabled; the jammer a ffects only the 2 APs). T a ble 5 contains v ar ious average conv er gence times for the sp ecific setting and for different P J v a lues. P J (dB) Con v ergence time (sec) 1 1.8 2 2.4 3 2.8 4 3.5 T able 5: Av erage con vergence times (in s ec) for different P J v alues . W e obser v e that even tho ug h the conv er gence time in- creases due to jamming, it still remains rather short. F ur thermore, we p erform extensive exp eriments with 8 APs, 19 c lie n ts and 4 balanced jammers with P J = 3 dBm, all unifor mly deplo yed. W e obs e rv e that in its distributed for m the p ower control module conv erg es in approximately 1 6 se c in our net work-wide exp erimen ts. Although one may exp ect differen t (lo wer or higher) con- vergence times with different ha rdw a re/softw are and/or mobile jammer s, these results s ho w that in a sta tic top ol- ogy the power control mo dule conv erge s rela tiv ely quickly . 7. SCOPE OF ARES F r om our ev aluations , it is eviden t that ARES ca n pr o - vide p erformance b enefits in the pr esence of jamming , even with other wireless technologies, and b oth in s ta tic and dynamically changing environment s. In this section, we discuss some design choices and the a pplicabilit y re- quirements of ARES. ARES do es not r e qui r e additional c ompli c ate d har dw ar e or softwar e functionaliti es: The tw o mo d- ules that constitute ARES ar e relatively ea sy to im- plement in the driv e r /firm ware of co mmodity wireless cards, and do not require any ha rdw a re changes. The only softw ar e mo dification neede d in the fir m ware in- volv es the CCA tuning functionality . Spec ific a lly , it should be pos sible to c hange the CCA threshold a s per the commands sent throug h a driver-firmw are so ck et inter- face. T o facilitate a distributed WLAN implementation of ARES, the AP driver needs to be modified to read the new Beac on template from the Beacons received fro m neighbor co -c ha nnel APs. Finally , clients need to apply the p ow er and CCA settings determined by their affili- ated AP . On the effe ctiveness of MRC: Our ana ly sis pro- vided in s ection 4 is an accurate to ol that decides b e- t ween the use of a fix e d r ate o r a rate adaptatio n s trat- egy . How ever, a pplying the ana ly sis in a r eal system is quite challenging, for v a rious rea sons. In particular, as discussed earlier the analysis requir es a se t of inputs which may not be re adily av aila ble . If the analysis were to b e applied in real time, ARES would need to obser v e these v alues on the fly and inv oke the rate mo dule when- ever significant, non-temp oral changes ar e o bserved. It is also difficult to der iv e the jammer’s distribution acc u- rately and quickly . Such requirements ma k e the appli- cation of the analys is somewhat infeasible in re al-time systems. F urthermor e, the ana lysis can acco un t for the presence of one jammer only . In s c enarios with multi- ple jammers, it cannot de c ide b etw een fix ed or adaptive rate. In contrast, o ur more practical scheme MR C does not need any inputs. It ca n op erate efficiently even with m ultiple jammer s. Note tha t MRC in its cur ren t for m takes into account the time 7 that has e la psed s ince the last time tha t rate co n trol was in voked. The policy is to inv oke the ra te adapta tio n stra tegy after p erio dic in ter - v a ls. The optimal rate a t which rate a daptation should be inv oked depends on the temp oral v ariability of the channel. In particular, to pe rform this optimally , ARES would need to measure (or estimate) the coherence time τ of the channel (time for which the channel r emains unch anged [34]) and inv oke the r ate control algorithm every τ secs. While this is not possible with current 802.11 har dw ar e, it may be p ossible in the future [3 4]. Alternatively ARES could employ a learning strategy a s discussed in Section 5. Enhancing the rate cont rol mo d- ule to address these issues is in our future plans. ARES wi th r e active and c onstant jammers: F or the most pa rt in this work we cons ide r ed v arious types of random jammers. With co nstan t ja mmers, r ate adapta- tion is not exp ected to provide benefits, since the contin- uous jamming interference does not allow the use of high rates. Nevertheless, rate control (even as a s t andalo n e mo dule) is exp ected to provide benefits in the pr esence of reactiv e jamming. In pa rticular, let us consider a link consisting of legitimate no des A and B. The rea c - tive jammer J needs to sense the ongoing transmissio n and quickly transmit its jamming signal. If we deno te by t f light , the flight time of the legitimate packet and with t sense the time nee ded for J to sense this pack et, then the probability of succesful pack et c orruption 8 can 7 In its current form, this time is in terms of the number of jamming cycles; this can b e easily mo dified to use more generic time units. 8 W e assume an optimal reactive jammer, i.e., one which is able to jam at the exact time instance when it senses a legiti- mate pac ket (b est case scenario for the adversary). In reality , this will not b e the case. 14 be calcula ted as: P j am = P ( t sense < t f light ). Assum- ing that t sensing is uniformly dis tr ibuted at the interv a l [0 , D I F S ] 9 we ge t: P j am = t f light Z 0 1 D I F S dt = t f light D I F S = # by tes/pack et rate · D I F S (2) F r om Eq. 2 it is clear that thro ug h the use of high bit rates and/ o r reduced pack et sizes the pro babilit y of succesful r eactiv e jamming ca n be decrea sed. How ever, there is a tr a deoff b etw een success ful reception and de- creased jamming proba bilit y that needs to be examined more carefully . Finally , the pow e r control mo dule of ARES, can be useful in the pr esence of b oth constant (as shown in the pr evious section) and reactive jamming. 8. CONCLUSIONS W e des ign, implement and ev aluate ARES, a n anti- jamming system for 802.1 1 netw o rks. ARES has b een built based on observ ations from extensive meas uremen ts on a n indo or testb ed in the presence of r andom jammers, and is primarily comp osed of tw o mo dules. The p ower c ontr ol m o dule tunes the CCA thresholds in order to al- low the transmission a nd ca pture of legitima te pack ets in the pr esence of the jammer’s s ignals, to the extent po ssible. The r ate c ont r ol mo dule decides b et ween fixed or ada ptiv e-r ate assig nmen t. W e demonstrate the e ffec- tiveness o f ARES in three different deployments (a) a 802.11 n based MIMO WLAN, (b) a mesh netw or k in- fested with mo bile ja mmers, and (c) a 802.1 1a WLAN with uplink TCP traffic. ARES ca n b e used in con- junction with other jamming mitigation techniques (such as frequency hopping or direc tio nal antennas). Ov er all, the application o f ARES leads to significant p erformance bene fits in jamming environments. Acknowledgmen ts The authors would like to thank Ralink T echnologies for providing us the Lin ux source driver for the R T28 60 AP and Intel Research, fo r providing us with the prototype firmw are of ipw2200 AP . 9. REFERENCES [1] SESP jammers. htt p://www.sesp.com/. [2] Jammi ng attac k at hack er conference. h ttp://findarticles.com/p /articles/mi m0EIN/ is 2005 August 2/ai n1484156 5. [3] T ec h w orld news. http://www.tec hw orld.com/mobili ty/ news/index.cfm?newsid=10941. 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