All posts under category "Computer Science / Game Theory"
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which they cannot afford the item. This single discontinuity introdu
Using Sperner's lemma for modified partition of a simplex we will constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions. We follow the Bishop style constructive mathematics.
This paper focuses on the cross-layer issue of resource allocation for energy efficiency in the uplink of a multiuser MIMO wireless communication system. Assuming that all of the transmitters and the uplink receiver are equipped with multiple antennas, the situation considered is that in which each
This paper focuses on a one person game called Indian policeman's dilemma (IPD). It represents the internal conflict between emotion and profession of a typical Indian police officer. We have 'split' the game to be played independently by different personality modules of the same player. Each module
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e., are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of $1+epsilon$. For the case of two-item two-bidder auctions we show that these auctions, termed Triage auctions, are the onl
We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a we
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to each other's payoff matrix. Each has to observe the other's
Currently, there is no universal method to track who shared what, with whom, when and for what purposes in a verifiable way to create an individual incentive for data owners. A platform that allows data owners to control, delete, and get rewards from sharing their data would be an important enabler
We present a constructive proof of Brouwer's fixed point theorem with sequentially at most one fixed point, and apply it to the mini-max theorem of zero-sum games.
In the famous Three-Door-Game Monte cannot help to win all the time by signaling location of the prize, using only the freedom he allowed to use. No matter which strategies played, there is always at least one door where the prize will not be found. However, already in the game with four doors coope
We propose a new approach to testing conformance to a nondeterministic specification, in which testing proceeds only as long as increased test coverage is guaranteed.
A boolean formula in a conjuctive normal form is called a (k,s)-formula if every clause contains exactly k variables and every variable occurs in at most s clauses. We prove the existence of a (k, 4 * (2^k/k))-CNF formula which is unsatisfiable.
We study the emph{Submodular Welfare Problem} (SWP), where items are partitioned among agents with monotone submodular utilities to maximize the total welfare under emph{bandit feedback}. Classical SWP assumes full value-oracle access, achieving $(1-1/e)$ approximations via continuous-greedy algorit
The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption is questionable. It is more reasonable to let the receiver re
In the theory of social choice the research is focused around the projection of individual preference orders to the social preference order. Also, the justification of the preference order formalism begins with the concept of utility i.e. an alternative is preferred to another one if the utility ove
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is increasing concern that such results may not re ect the difficulty of manipulation in practice. In this tutorial, I surv
This paper provides a tutorial overview of game theoretic techniques used for communication over frequency selective interference channels. We discuss both competitive and cooperative techniques. Keywords: Game theory, competitive games, cooperative games, Nash Equilibrium, Nash bargaining solutio
Recent mobile equipment (as well as the norm IEEE 802.21) now offers the possibility for users to switch from one technology to another (vertical handover). This allows flexibility in resource assignments and, consequently, increases the potential throughput allocated to each user. In this paper, we
Interpretation of animal behavior, especially as cooperative or selfish, is a challenge for evolutionary theory. Strategy of a competition should follow from corresponding Darwinian payoffs for the available behavioral options. The payoffs and decision making processes, however, are difficult to obs
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium. Nash's approach to the problem for strategic games is probabilist
The quest for optimal/stable paths in graphs has gained attention in a few practical or theoretical areas. To take part in this quest this chapter adopts an equilibrium-oriented approach that is abstract and general: it works with (quasi-arbitrary) arc-labelled digraphs, and it assumes very little a
We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has contrasted the social cost of Nash equilibria with the best pos
In this work we study of competitive situations among users of a set of global resources. More precisely we study the effect of cost policies used by these resources in the convergence time to a pure Nash equilibrium. The work is divided in two parts. In the theoretical part we prove lower and upper
In a society of completely selfish individuals where everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilibrium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody would benefit from unilaterally changing his strategy
This paper introduces a model based upon games on an evolving network, and develops three clustering algorithms according to it. In the clustering algorithms, data points for clustering are regarded as players who can make decisions in games. On the network describing relationships among data points
This document consists of two parts: the second part was submitted earlier as a new proof of Nash's theorem, and the first part is a note explaining a problem found in that proof. We are indebted to Sergiu Hart and Eran Shmaya for their careful study which led to their simultaneous discovery of this
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. We analyze na
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally, we restrict the treatment to two player games, but results an
In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency
This paper focuses on the cross-layer issue of joint multiuser detection and resource allocation for energy efficiency in wireless CDMA networks. In particular, assuming that a linear multiuser detector is adopted in the uplink receiver, the case considered is that in which each terminal is allowed
Market-based conservation instruments, such as payments, auctions or tradable permits, are environmental policies that create financial incentives for landowners to engage in voluntary conservation on their land. But what if ecological processes operate across property boundaries and land use decisi
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation rule. Our main result i
The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given flow demand. We parameterize the degree of cooperation which a
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie) about each pair of options. The proposed method is proved to have certain de
In this paper, we present an approach for fault-tolerant synthesis by combining predefined patterns for fault-tolerance with algorithmic game solving. A non-fault-tolerant system, together with the relevant fault hypothesis and fault-tolerant mechanism templates in a pool are translated into a distr
We consider the celebrated Blackwell Approachability Theorem for two-player games with vector payoffs. We show that Blackwell's result is equivalent, via efficient reductions, to the existence of 'no-regret' algorithms for Online Linear Optimization. Indeed, we show that any algorithm for one such p
How cooperation emerges and persists in a population of selfish agents is a fundamental question in evolutionary game theory. Our research shows that Collective Strategies with Master-Slave Mechanism (CSMSM) defeat Tit-for-Tat and other well-known strategies in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma. A
Research has shown that the addition of abstention as an option transforms social dilemmas to rock-paper-scissor type games, where defectors dominate cooperators, cooperators dominate abstainers (loners), and abstainers (loners), in turn, dominate defectors. In this way, abstention can sustain coope
We study the time-bounded reachability problem for continuous-time Markov decision processes (CTMDPs) and games (CTMGs). Existing techniques for this problem use discretisation techniques to break time into discrete intervals, and optimal control is approximated for each interval separately. Current
We consider two-player turn-based games with zero-reachability and zero-safety objectives generated by extended vector addition systems with states. Although the problem of deciding the winner in such games is undecidable in general, we identify several decidable and even tractable subcases of this
In earlier work, we proposed a logic that extends the Logic of General Awareness of Fagin and Halpern [1988] by allowing quantification over primitive propositions. This makes it possible to express the fact that an agent knows that there are some facts of which he is unaware. In that logic, it is n
Ads on the Internet are increasingly sold via ad exchanges such as RightMedia, AdECN and Doubleclick Ad Exchange. These exchanges allow real-time bidding, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange ``calls out'' to solicit bids from ad networks. This aspect of soliciting bi
We consider the symmetric rendezvous search game on a complete graph of n locations. In 1990, Anderson and Weber proposed a strategy in which, over successive blocks of n-1 steps, the players independently choose either to stay at their initial location or to tour the other n-1 locations, with proba
Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e., the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by ly
A mechanism for releasing information about a statistical database with sensitive data must resolve a trade-off between utility and privacy. Privacy can be rigorously quantified using the framework of {em differential privacy}, which requires that a mechanism's output distribution is nearly the same
Elementary decision-theoretic analysis of the Monty Hall dilemma shows that the problem has dominance. This makes possible to discard nonswitching strategies, without making any assumptions on the prior distribution of factors out of control of the decision maker. A path to the Bayesian and the mini
Two players alternate tossing a biased coin where the probability of getting heads is p. The current player is awarded alpha points for tails and alpha+beta for heads. The first player reaching n points wins. For a completely unfair coin the player going first certainly wins. For other coin biases,
As we show by using notions of equilibrium in infinite sequential games, crashes or financial escalations are rational for economic or environmental agents, who have a vision of an infinite world. This contradicts a picture of a self-regulating, wise and pacific economic world. In other words, in th
We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local diameter or its total distance to other players in the (undirected) un
We study the combinatorial two-player game Tron. We answer the extremal question on general graphs and also consider smaller graph classes. Bodlaender and Kloks conjectured in [2] PSPACE- completeness. We proof this conjecture.
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