Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

SPECTR UM TRADING AN ABSTRA CTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Loretta Mastro eni - Maurizio Naldi No vem b er 2, 2021 Abstract This do cumen t contains a bibliographic list of ma jor pap ers on sp ec- trum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to oﬀer researc hers en tering this ﬁeld a fast panorama of the curren t literature. The list is con- tin ually up dated on the webpage http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/ naldi/Ricspt.html . Omissions and pap ers suggested for inclusion ma y b e p oin ted out to the authors through e-mail ( naldi@disp.unir oma2.it ). 1 Abstracted Bibliograph y • I.F. Akyildiz, W.Y. Lee, M.C. V uran, and S. Mohan ty . Next genera- tion/dynamic spectrum access/cognitiv e radio wireless netw orks: a surv ey . Computer Networks , 50(13):2127–2159, 2006 Abstr act : T o day’s wireless netw orks are c haracterized by a ﬁxed sp ec- trum assignment policy . How ever, a large p ortion of the assigned sp ectrum is used sporadically and geographical v ariations in the utilization of as- signed sp ectrum ranges from 15% to 85% with a high v ariance in time. The limited a vailable sp ectrum and the ineﬃciency in the spectrum usage necessitate a new communication paradigm to exploit the existing wire- less spectrum opportunistically . This new netw orking paradigm is referred to as NeXt Generation (xG) Netw orks as well as Dynamic Sp ectrum Ac- cess (DSA) and cognitive radio netw orks. The term xG networks is used throughout the paper. The no v el functionalities and current research chal- lenges of the xG net works are explained in detail. More speciﬁcally , a brief ov erview of the cognitiv e radio technology is provided and the xG net work architecture is introduced. Moreov er, the xG netw ork functions such as spectrum management, sp ectrum mobility and spectrum sharing are ex- plained in detail. The inﬂuence of these functions on the performance of the upp er lay er protocols suc h as routing and transp ort are in vestigated and open research issues in these areas are also outlined. Finally , the cross-la yer design c hallenges in xG net works are discussed. • I.F. Akyildiz, W.-Y. Lee, and K.R. Chowdh ury . Sp ectrum management in cognitive radio ad hoc netw orks. IEEE Network , 23(4):6–12, 2009 Abstr act : The problem of sp ectrum scarcity and ineﬃciency in sp ec- trum usage will be addressed b y the newly emerging cognitiv e radio paradigm that allows radios to opportunistically transmit in the v acan t p ortions of the sp ectrum already assigned to licensed users. F or this, the ability for spectrum sensing, sp ectrum sharing, choosing the b est spectrum among the av ailable options, and dynamically adapting transmission parameters based on the activit y of the licensed sp ectrum owners must b e integrated within cognitive radio users. Sp eciﬁcally in cognitiv e radio ad hoc net works, distributed multihop architecture, node mobility , and spatio-temp oral v ari- ance in spectrum av ailability are some of the k ey distinguishing factors. In this article the imp ortant features of CRAHNs are presen ted, along with the design approaches and research challenges that m ust b e addressed. Spec- trum managemen t in CRAHNs comprises sp ectrum sensing, sharing, deci- sion, and mobility . In this article eac h of these functions are describ ed in detail from the viewp oint of multihop infrastructureless netw orks requiring coop eration among users. • J. Bae, E. Beigman, R. Berry , M.L. Honig, H. Shen, R. V ohra, and H. Zhou. Sp ectrum markets for wireless services. In 3r d IEEE Symp osium on New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks DySP AN 2008 , pages 1–10, Chicago, 14-17 Octob er 2008 Abstr act : It has been widely recognized that the curren t under-utilization of sp ectrum across many bands could be alleviated through the application of sp ectrum markets. So far, discussions of market mechanisms for sp ec- trum allocations hav e focused primarily on secondary markets, whic h are managed by licensees. Here we explore the consequences of lifting cur- rent restrictions on allocations and ownership, and allowing more extensive markets for allo cating sp ectrum across locations, times, and diverse sets of applications (e.g., broadcast, cellular, broadband data, emergency , etc). 2 T o motiv ate our discussion we ﬁrst estimate the ac hiev able rate per user that could be provided by sharing a large portion of the spectrum suitable for cellular and broadcast types of services. Our results suggest that in general the demand for sp ectrum may exceed supply implying that market mechanisms are needed to a void a tragedy of the commons (i.e., asso ciated with an alternativ e commons mo del). W e then discuss a tw o- tier sp ectrum market structure for wireless se rvices in which licenses for spectrum assets at particular lo cations are traded as commodities. Sp ectrum owners can choose to ren t or lease their spectrum assets via sp ot markets at particular locations. Such an approach may low er barriers to entry into the wireless services market thereby facilitating competition and the introduction of new services. • Pieter Ballon and Simon Delaere. Flexible sp ectrum and future business mo dels for the mobile industry . T elematics and Informatics , 26(3):249– 258, 2009 Abstr act : The concept of ﬂexible sp ectrum is often considered as a medium-to-long-term solution to ov ercome some of the current ineﬃcien- cies and high entry barriers plaguing the mobile industry . Increasingly , a cognitive pilot channel (CPC) is regarded as a central enabler for ﬂexible spectrum. This pap er outlines the CPC concept from a business p oin t of view and clariﬁes its current status in the standardization and regu- lation ﬁelds. The idea of a worldwide CPC will be under consideration by the W orld Radio Conference in 2011. Based on several p otential CPC implementations, the pap er iden tiﬁes a num b er of ﬂexible sp ectrum busi- ness conﬁgurations and reven ue sharing mo dels. It also p erforms an initial forward-looking ev aluation of these mo dels using a business mo del score- card approach, and ﬁnds that while the scope appears to b e limited for a fully competitive, cross-operator sp ectrum mark et, several platform mo dels (e.g. asso ciation or consortium mo dels) stand out as feasible options. • E. Ba yrak. W elfare eﬀects of sp ectrum managemen t regimes. In New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks, 2008. DySP AN 2008. 3r d IEEE Symp osium on , pages 1 –11, 14-17 2008 Abstr act : W e build a model where consumers ha ve preferences, ov er a range of v arieties, for communications devices and device qualities. De- vices use radio spectrum and are pro duced and sold in a competitive device market. In such a mo del, the c hoice on the spectrum managemen t regime greatly aﬀects market outcomes and consumer welfare. The choice on the spectrum management regime eﬀectively determines the ﬁnal num ber of ﬁrms in the market and the electromagnetic noise levels ﬁrms become sub- ject to when deciding on the information transmission capabilities of their devices. W e sim ulate such a mo del over a wide range of mo del parame- ters. W e ﬁnd that the commons regime where the access to and the use of spectrum is not restricted to license holders creates consumer welfare for a wider and more reasonable mo del parameters than the licensing regime where the access to and the use of spectrum is granted to predetermined num b er of licensees. • C. Bazelon. Licensed or unlicensed: The economic considerations in incre- men tal sp ectrum allocations. Communic ations Magazine, IEEE , 47(3):110 –116, march 2009 Abstr act : A t present, no existing market mechanism allows for the trading of radio sp ectrum b et w een licensed and unlicensed uses. When- ever sp ectrum is made av ailable for reallo cation, the FCC faces a dilemma in determining which access regime to use. F or example, the television white spaces are largely un used and av ailable for reallocation. Since both licensed and unlicensed allocations are v aluable, allo cation decisions (for 3 the TV white spaces or any new band of radio sp ectrum) must b e based on a clear understanding of the trade-oﬀs b etw een the tw o c hoices. This ar- ticle deﬁnes economic criteria that can b e used in making these important decisions. Economic criteria can go b eyond the simple measures of proﬁt and consumer surplus from mark et transactions. Although some measures of b eneﬁt, suc h as the v alue of inno v ation, ma y be diﬃcult to quan tify , the analytic economic framework presen ted here can easily incorporate them. This analysis do es not address any noneconomic considerations in choos- ing b etw een licensed and unlicensed uses. As one example, the issue of potential so cietal beneﬁts from promoting minority ownership of spectrum through restricted licenses - something only p ossible in a licensed regime - is not addressed in this economic analysis. The analysis herein pro vides the economic information needed for p olicy analysis; it need not b e the sum total of that p olicy analysis. Standard economic theory tells us that the v alue of an additional unit of sp ectrum is equal to the increase in socially beneﬁcial services it produces. F or licensed spectrum all o wed to trade in markets, this v alue is relatively easy to calculate: It is the price ﬁrms pa y for the licensed sp ectrum. The equation is more complex, how ever, when unlicensed sp ectrum is inv olved. The current value of unlicensed spectrum bands is equal to the sum of the v alue of the sp ectrum in all uses in those bands. The incremental v alue of additional sp ectrum allo cated to unli- censed uses, howev er, is based - on the relief to congestion the additional spectrum will pro vide. Unlicensed spectrum also con tains a v alue asso ci- ated with the p ossibilit y of future innov ation made av ailable by the low er transaction .costs of gaining access to unlicensed sp ectrum. This option v alue increases with additional allo cations of unlicensed sp ectrum, leading to the beneﬁt of incremental option v alue from additional unlicensed spec- trum. The formula for the beneﬁts from additional unlicensed sp ectrum allocations can b e summarized as ”congestion alleviation plus incremental option v alue.” I apply the analysis dev elop ed in this article to the case of TV white spaces. I use information from the recen t auction of the lo wer 700 MHz band E blo ck to calculate the incremental v alue of licensing the white spaces. I also calibrate an estimate of the incremental v alue of the white spaces under an unlicensed allo cation. Initial calibration of the economic criteria that determine the trade-oﬀ b etw een incremental licensed and un- licensed sp ectrum allocations indicates that currently licensing incremen tal allocations is the fav ored p olicy . If p olicy makers choose to allo cate incre- mental sp ectrum as unlicensed, they should recognize the economic costs of that choice. • T. B¨ orgers and C. Dustmann. Aw arding telecom licences: the recen t Eu- rop ean exp erience. Ec onomic Policy , 18:215–268, April 2003 Abstr act : This pap er analyses the pro cedures used by diﬀerent Eu- ropean countries for awarding sp ectrum licences to p otential op erators of third generation (3G) mobile telephone netw orks. W e contrast market- based methods, suc h as auctions, with bureaucratic metho ds, suc h as ‘b eaut y contests’. They have b een used for decisions ab out tw o ma jor questions: (1) How many licences should b e aw arded, and how muc h sp ectrum should each licence giv e access to?; (2) Which companies should receiv e which li- cences, and how much should they pay for their licences? Most countries used a bureaucratic process to answer the ﬁrst question. Howev er, Ger- many , Austria and Greece w ere diﬀeren t, and constructed auctions in which the num b er and size of licences w ere determined by the auction itself. As for the second question, there was muc h v ariation b etw een countries, and both auctions, and ‘b eaut y contests’ w ere p opular methods. W e ha ve four main ﬁndings. First, the bureaucratic procedure used b y most countries to answer the ﬁrst question led to companies concealing relev ant information from the authorities. Second, while ﬁrms may ha v e tried to manipulate the procedures used in German y , Austria and Greece to deter entry to their markets, they were surprisingly unsuccessful in this. Third, the traditional economic criticisms of beauty contests seem to apply to some, but not to 4 all those that were conducted. Finally , the bidding strategies adopted b y the telecom companies were often more complex than those predi cted b y economic theory • M. Byk owsky . A secondary market for the trading of sp ectrum: promoting mark et liquidity . T ele c ommunic ations Policy , 27(7):533 – 541, 2003 Abstr act : The developmen t of a successful secondary mark et for the trading of spectrum is not a foregone conclusion. The multi-dimensional nature of radio sp ectrum, whic h requires that a bid to buy and an oﬀer to sell conform across the multiple dimensions, suggests that the market may be very “thin.” In addition, existing commercial users of sp ectrum hav e little incentiv e to sell excess sp ectrum if suc h spectrum will b e employ ed by the buy er to provide a service that comp etes with the service provider by the seller. This pap er discusses sev eral steps to enhance mark et liquid- ity . One approach inv olv es obtaining participation from federal spectrum users. Another step in volves developing a mark et that b oth enhances mar- ket liquidity and pro vides participants the opportunity to incorp orate a call option in the traded asset. • M. Byko wsky , M. Olson, and W. Sharkey . Eﬃciency gains from using a mark et approac h to sp ectrum management. Information Ec onomics and Policy , 22(1):73 – 90, 2010 Abstr act : This paper is concerned with the merits of employing mark et forces to address the issues of wireless spectrum congestion and the allo ca- tion of sp ectrum b et ween ﬁrms seeking licensed and unlicensed sp ectrum rights. W e sho w that when unlicensed sp ectrum is assigned to all compet- ing users during p erio ds of excess demand an ineﬃcien t outcome related to the “T ragedy of the Commons” is lik ely to result. This ineﬃciency can be substantially reduced when the assignment of users to unlicensed sp ectrum is based on the bandwidth and latency tolerance needs of the competing users. F urther eﬃciency gains can also o ccur when users are required to bid to ha ve their “unlicensed sp ectrum” needs met in the presence of con- gestion. The paper also examines the merits of creating an auction based market in whic h ﬁrms providing sp ectrum based services to users bid to hav e their “sp ectrum regime” needs satisﬁed. The ob jective of this ap- proach is to reduce the incen tive that service operators hav e to misstate their expressed v alue for a given license regime. The eﬃciency of this ap- proach is based in large part on the auction mechanism’s ability to solv e a “collective action problem” in which ﬁrms desiring unlicensed sp ectrum hav e an incentiv e to “free-ride” on the bidding b eha vior of other unlicensed ﬁrms. T ogether our results op en up the possibility that a wide v ariety of spectrum p olicy issues ma y b e eﬃciently solved using a mark et-based ap- proach. They further suggest that there ma y b e a “h ybrid” regime that combines the b est features of the license and unlicensed regimes and, th us, lead to a more eﬃcient use of spectrum at an y moment in time. • C.E. Caicedo and M.B.H. W eiss. Sp ectrum trading: An analysis of imple- men tation issues. In New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks, 2007. DySP AN 2007. 2nd IEEE International Symp osium on , pages 579– 584, April 2007 Abstr act : The assignment of sp ectrum licenses through sp ectrum trad- ing markets can b e used as a mechanism to grant access to sp ectrum to those who v alue it most and can use it more eﬃcien tly . Although v arious methods for improv ed sp ectrum assignmen t ha ve been prop osed along the lines of Dynamic Sp ectrum Allocation (DSA) and others, several issues re- lated to their implementation are still unsolv ed. Among them, how to deal with interference in a multi-pro vider environmen t and determining the el- ements and architectures for feasible implemen tations of spectrum trading 5 markets. This paper analyzes sev eral proposed kinds of trading in teractions that may arise in a spectrum trading market and proposes a taxonomy of architectures that could b e used to implement them. W e also discuss the beneﬁts and limitations of using a single or restricted set of wireless stan- dards in the implementation of a spectrum trading infrastructure as a step tow ards Wireless Bandwidth T rading whic h is proposed as a possible path for a realizable instance of mark ets based on spectrum trading concepts. • Martin Cav e. Anti-competitive b ehaviour in spectrum mark ets: Analysis and resp onse. T ele c ommunic ations Policy , 34(5-6):251 – 261, 2010 Abstr act : The introduction of spectrum trading creates opp ortunities for op erators, singly or jointly , to foreclose entry in to downstream mar- kets by accumulating unneeded sp ectrum holdings. After considering how these issues are treated under administrative metho ds of sp ectrum man- agement, the pap er examines the degree of substitutability of frequencies with or without regulatory constraints, concluding that the latter are a ma jor source of limitations on substitutabilit y . This may create a case for interv ention in the transition to a sp ectrum market. Alternative forms of interv ention are considered, including caps on spectrum holdings or on the acquisition of sp ectrum at an y aw ard • J.M. Chapin and W.H. Lehr. The path to mark et success for dynamic sp ectrum access technology . IEEE Communic ations Magazine , 45(5):96– 103, May 2007 Abstr act : Rapid progress is b eing made in the tec hnology for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) radio systems. How ever, the structure and dynam- ics of the wireless service market must also evolv e for DSA to succeed. This article examines the interlink ed tecnical and economic issues associ- ated with markets for DSA-based wireless services. W e use this analysis to make tec hnical and p olicy recommendations supp orting the commercial success of DSA technology . • J.M. Chapin and W.H. Lehr. Time-limited leases in radio systems. IEEE Communic ations Magazine , 45(6):76–82, June 2007 Abstr act : A time-limited lease is a set of rights that expires after a speciﬁed duration. W e analyze w ays to use leases to facilitate innov ation in radio devices and wireless communication. In our vision, manufacturers include in their devices a simple, secure subsystem that con tains a clo ck and disables sp eciﬁc transmit capabilities if no extension message is received by the end of the lease p erio d. When devices pro vide this support, regulators may use certiﬁcation leases rather than p ermanen t grants to accelerate deploymen t of innov ative radios. Spectrum rights holders ma y use leases to reduce risk in secondary spectrum market transactions. Firms collaborating in inno vativ e wireless service business mo dels can better retain control of their resp ective rights. W e examine b oth the technical and p olicy issues associated with leases. • Cho ong Ming Chin, S. Olafsson, B. Virginas, and G. Owusu. T rading strategies in radio sp ectrum management. In Wir eless Pervasive Com- puting, 2008. ISWPC 2008. 3r d International Symp osium on , pages 680 –684, 7-9 2008 Abstr act : Radio resource management (RRM) is one of the most chal- lenging and one of the most imp ortan t asp ects in the provisioning of qual- ity of service (QoS) for wireless communication systems. With the ever increasing size of wireless mobile communit y and its demand for high- speed multimedia communications, eﬃcien t resource management b ecomes 6 a paramount imp ortance due to limited resources av ailable suc h as spec- trum and power a v ailability . A s radio spectrum is a ﬁnite resource, new approaches are therefore needed to maximize the existing spectrum to en- sure the wireless userspsila and net work providerspsila QoS requirements are met. In this pap er we prop ose a nov el radio sp ectrum trading via deriv atives contracts as a means to address short-term demands for spec- trum whilst ensuring end-to-end QoS is met. • Cho ong Ming Chin, S. Olafsson, B. Virginas, and G. Owusu. Radio re- source management via sp ectrum trading. In V ehicular T e chnolo gy Con- fer enc e, 2008. VTC Spring 2008. IEEE , pages 1781 –1785, 11-14 2008 Abstr act : The growth in the deplo yment of wireless systems and tec h- nologies sho ws that in this rapidly evolving and expanding environmen t, radio resource managemen t (RRM) is fast becoming the most signiﬁcant aspect in the provisioning of qualit y of service (QoS) for wireless netw orks. As radio sp ectrum is a ﬁnite resource, new approaches are therefore needed to maximize the existing spectrum to ensure the wireless users’ and net- work pro viders’ QoS requirements are met. In this pap er we propose a nov el radio sp ectrum trading via deriv atives contracts as a means to ad- dress short-term demands for sp ectrum whilst ensuring end-to-end QoS is met. • Pietro Cro cioni. Is allowing trading enough? making secondary markets in sp ectrum work. T ele c ommun. Policy , 33(8):451–468, 2009 Abstr act : The debate on sp ectrum reforms has mostly focused on the choice b etw een a prop erty rights and a commons regime. This article argues that moving to a prop erty righ t system requires careful attention to details in order to a void that ”micro” rather than ”macro” factors may preven t eﬃcient trades from taking place. It pro vides a framew ork to conduct this assessment, iden tiﬁes a num b er of p ossible concerns and puts forward some solutions. • A. Al Daoud, M. Alany ali, and D. Starobinski. Secondary pricing of sp ec- trum in cellular cdma netw orks. In New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks, 2007. DySP AN 2007. 2nd IEEE International Symp o- sium on , pages 535 –542, 17-20 2007 Abstr act : W e study secondary pricing of spectrum in wireless cellular netw orks emplo ying CDMA at the ph ysical lay er. W e consider a primary license holder who aims to lease its sp ectrum within a certain geographic subregion of its o wn netw ork. Such a transaction has tw o contrasting eco- nomic implications for the seller: On the one hand the seller obtains a reven ue due to the exercised price, or rent, of the region. On the other hand, the seller incurs a cost due to (i) reduced spatial cov erage of its net- work and (ii) possible in terference from the leased region in to the retained portion of its netw ork. W e formulate an optimization problem with the ob jective of proﬁt maximization, and c haracterize its solutions based on a reduced load appro ximation that can b e sho wn to b e asymptotically ex- act. The form of optimal prices suggests c harging the buy er per admitted call, in prop ortion with the interference it generates. The c harged amount balances the corresp onding loss of reven ue incurred by the seller due to the inﬂuence of an admitted call. W e numerically argue that this pricing approach yields b etter proﬁt compared to some other simplistic tec hniques. • A. Al Daoud, M. Alan y ali, and D. Starobinski. On pricing of spectrum in secondary markets. In Information The ory and Applic ations Workshop, 2007 , pages 11 –15, jan. 2007 7 Abstr act : Optimal price of spectrum in secondary markets is studied. W e consider a primary license holder who aims to lease the right to provide service in a given subset of its cov erage area. Such a transaction has tw o contrasting economic implications for the seller: on the one hand the seller obtains a rev enue due to the exercised price of the region. On the other hand, the seller incurs a cost due to (i) reduced spatial cov erage of its net- work and (ii) possible in terference from the leased region in to the retained portion of its netw ork. W e formulate an optimization problem with the ob jective of proﬁt maximization, and c haracterize its solutions based on a reduced load approximation. The form of optimal price suggests c harging each admitted call in prop ortion to the attendant reven ue loss due to the generated in terference. • A. Al Daoud, M. Alany ali, and D. Starobinski. Pricing strategies for sp ec- trum lease in secondary markets. Networking, IEEE/ACM T r ansactions on , 18(2):462 –475, april 2010 Abstr act : W e develop analytical models to characterize pricing of spec- trum righ ts in cellular CDMA net works. Speciﬁcally , w e consider a primary license holder that aims to lease its sp ectrum within a certain geographic subregion of its net work. Suc h a transaction has tw o contrasting economic implications: On the one hand the lessor obtains a reven ue due to the ex- ercised price of the region. On the other hand, it incurs a cost due to: (1) reduced spatial cov erage of its netw ork; and (2) p ossible interference from the leased region into the retained p ortion of its netw ork, leading to increased call blo cking. W e formulate this tradeoﬀ as an optimization problem, with the ob jective of proﬁt maximization. W e consider a range of pricing philosophies and derive near-optimal solutions that are based on a reduced load approximation (RLA) for estimating blocking probabil- ities. The form of these prices suggests charging the lessee in prop ortion to the fraction of admitted calls. W e also exploit the special structure of the solutions to devise an eﬃcient iterativ e pro cedure for computing prices. W e presen t n umerical results that demonstrate superiority of the prop osed strategy over sev eral alternative strategies. The results emphasize imp or- tance of eﬀective pricing strategies in bringing secondary mark ets to full realization. • Ashraf Al Daoud, Murat Alan y ali, and David Starobinski. Pricing sp ec- trum access in cellular cdma net works with heterogeneous demand. In Br o adb and Communic ations, Networks and Systems, 2007. BRO ADNETS 2007. F ourth International Confer enc e on , pages 469 –475, 10-14 2007 Abstr act : W e consider pricing secondary access to wireless sp ectrum in cellular CDMA netw orks. W e study the case for a primary license holder interested in leasing the right of providing service in a given geographical region of its cov erage netw ork. The goal is to price access to the cells in that region under heterogeneous call traﬃc demand with the ob jective of proﬁt maximization. While a reven ue is gained from the leased region due to the exercised price, the primary license holder incurs a loss due to reduced spatial cov erage of the netw ork and also due to interference eﬀect from the leased into the retained region. W e exploit the spatial eﬀect of interference due to geographical lo cations of the cells and set a price per cell rather than pricing the whole region by a scalar quantit y . W e employ reduced load approximations whic h hav e prov ed useful in classical telephony and c haracterize optimal prices for diﬀerent pricing philosophies, e.g., ﬂat pricing and demand-based pricing. The obtained formula of prices suggests c harging p er admitted call in proportion with the in terference that the call generates. The c harged amoun t balances the corresponding loss of reven ue due to the inﬂuence of an admitted call. W e presen t an iterative price computing technique and pro vide a numerical study in supp ort of our analytical results. 8 • A.S. De V any , R.D. Eck ert, C.J. Mey ers, D.J. O’Hara, and R.C. Scott. A prop ert y system for mark et allo cation of the electromagnetic spectrum: A legal-economic-engineering study . Stanfor d L aw R eview , 21:1499–1561, June 1969 • A. De V any . Implementing a mark et–based sp ectrum p olicy . Journal of L aw & Ec onomics , 41:627–646, 1998 Abstr act : The sp ectrum auctions were a step tow ard the Herzel?Coase vision of a ﬂexible and eﬃcient market for sp ectrum. This article examines what remains to b e done. Sp ectrum must b e un bundled from broadcast and transmission facilities. The “commo ditization” of spectrum will facilitate standardization, price disco very , and open access to diverse users. A liquid secondary sp ectrum mark et will lower transactions and entry cost, making telecommunications markets contestable. Auctions should be used to elicit a supply of spectrum from licensees as well as to allocate it to new users. In closing the sp ectrum commons, Congress granted use to a privileged few. Unbundled sp ectrum prop erty rights, commo ditization, and open markets will giv e the public access to this public resource. • L. Doyle and T. F orde. T ow ards a ﬂuid spectrum market for exclusive usage rights. In 2nd IEEE Symp osium on New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks DySP AN 2007 , pages 620–632, Dublin, 17-20 April 2007 Abstr act : This pap er fo cuses on highly ﬂuid markets for trading exclu- sive sp ectrum usage-rights. The purp ose of the pap er is to underline the need for ﬂexible usage-rights p olicies, as a core facilitator of such mark ets as w ell as to stress the need for a greater technical input to the debate. The pap er builds on current w ork in the ﬁeld of sp ectrum prop erty righ ts and exclusive usage-rights. The ﬁrst half of the pap er captures the current state-of-play and presents a framework for visualizing the concepts inv olved. The pap er go es on to mak e a clear distinction b etw een the deﬁning of a set of exclusiv e usage-righ ts and the exercising of those righ ts. This leads to a discussion of policies that are not alone ab out deﬁning metrics and setting their desired v alues but are also ab out b ehaviors that inv olve negotiation and interaction. Through-out the pap er the evolution of tec hnology and its aﬀect on the progress to wards the goal of ﬂuid sp ectrum markets is em- phasized, as is the need for a v ery multifaceted approach to the challenges inv olved. • L. Duan, J. Huang, and B. Shou. Comp etition with dynamic sp ectrum leasing. IEEE DySP AN , April 2010 Abstr act : Dynamic spectrum leasing can greatly enhance the sp ectrum eﬃciency and encourage more ﬂexible services in the sp ectrum market. This pap er presen ts a comprehensive study of the in teractions of t wo com- petitive secondary netw ork operators who need to make optimal in vestmen t and pricing decisions with heterogeneous inv estment costs and users’ wire- less characteris- tics. The tw o operators need to determine their optimal spectrum leasing amounts from the spectrum o wners, and comp ete to sell the spectrum to secondary users. The asymmetric leasing costs and the heterogeneity of users’ channel conditions and transmission pow ers make the analysis quite c hallenging. W e mo del the in teractions betw een the op- erators and the users as a three-stage dynamic game. W e sho w that when the leasing costs are small for b oth op erators, there are inﬁnitely many inv estment (leasing) equilibria. When the t wo costs are high and compa- rable, there exists a unique inv estment equilibrium where both op erators lease positive amoun ts. When the costs are high and very diﬀerent, the operator with the smaller cost will dominate the market as a monop olist. W e also show that a meaningful pricing equilibrium exists only when total 9 bandwidth inv estment of the op erators is no larger than a threshold. Each user receives a fair resource allo cation that only dep ends on the leasing costs of the op erators and is independent of other users’ wireless charac- teristics. W e also compare the comp etitive equilibria with the case where the tw o operators co operate to maximize the total proﬁt. W e sho w that the Price of Anarch y for the total proﬁt is 75comp etition is no larger than 25% in the worst case. W e also sho w that the users always beneﬁt from competition in terms of their pay oﬀs. • M.C. F arquhar and A.Q. Fitzgerald. Legal and regulatory issues regarding sp ectrum righ ts trading. T ele c ommunic ations Policy , 27:527–532, August 2003 Abstr act : The FCC’s historic “command-and-control” approach to spec- trum management has contributed to sp ectrum scarcity , esp ecially as it relates to spectrum b elow 3 GHz. This approach has also made it diﬃ- cult for spectrum users to adjust their business plans to the needs of the marketplace. A more ﬂexible regulatory regime w ould increase sp ectrum eﬃciency and foster inno v ation and new services. In order to promote more ﬂexible use of spectrum, the authors recommend a n umber of regulatory and statutory c hanges, including (1) the elimination of use restrictions for new wireless allocations; (2) the replacement of existing use restrictions with power limits suﬃcient to minimize the p oten tial for harmful interference; (3) the enactment of rules expressly allowing priv ate parties to “con tract around” established interference limits; and (4) the identiﬁcation of “safe harbor” spectrum leasing arrangemen ts that are deemed permissible under the F CC’s license transfer of control requirements. The authors also recom- mend a n umber of statutory reforms, including granting the FCC express statutory authorit y to auction spectrum licenses held b y priv ate parties and assess spectrum fees upon users of auction-exempt sp ectrum. • B. F reyens. A p olicy spectrum for sp ectrum economics. Information Ec o- nomics and Policy , 21(2):128–144, 2009 Abstr act : Recent reforms to radio sp ectrum regulation ha ve spark ed contro versy ov er the resp ective merits of tw o mutually exclusive liberal- ization regimes: prop erty righ ts and commons. This debate is restrictiv e because it is largely incomplete and misundersto od. It is also costly in terms of opp osition and dela ys to reforms. Goals of eﬃcien t sp ectrum allo- cation are better served by a wider p olicy toolkit, inclusive of hybrid and intermediary regimes. In this article I sketch the contours of a ‘sp ectrum of sp ectrum regimes’, triangulating regulatory , priv ate o wnership and unli- censed approaches. I illustrate this triangulated mo del, which I then apply to confron t allocative decisions in digital dividend p olicy , such as the F CC’s open access clause in the 700 MHz auction and Ofcom’s current review of UHF spectrum release in the 800 MHz band. • S. Gandhi, C. Buragohain, L. Cao, H. Zheng, and S. Suri. T ow ards real- time dynamic sp ectrum auctions. Computer Networks , 52(4):879–897, 2008 Abstr act : In this paper, we prop ose a lo w-complexity auction frame- work to distribute sp ectrum in real-time among a large number of wire- less users with dynamic traﬃc. Our design consists of a compact and highly expressiv e bidding format, tw o pricing mo dels to con trol tradeoﬀs b e- tw een reven ue and fairness, and fast auction clearing algorithms to achieve conﬂict-free spectrum allo cations that maximize auction rev enue. W e de- velop analytical b ounds on algorithm performance and complexit y to verify the eﬃciency of the proposed approach. W e also use b oth simulated and real deploymen t traces to ev aluate the auction framework. W e conclude that pricing mo dels and bidding b ehaviors hav e signiﬁcant impact on auc- tion outcomes and sp ectrum utilization. Any eﬃcien t sp ectrum auction 10 system must consider demand and spectrum av ailability in local regions to maximize system-wide revenue and sp ectrum utilization. • W. Glo ver and M. Nek ov ee. Dynamic Sp ectrum: Going the full circle. In 2nd IEEE Symp osium on New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks (DySP AN 2007) , Dublin, April 2007 Abstr act : Recent technological progress has brought new life to the notion of ”just-in-time” sp ectrum management, raising the concern that further developmen t is b eing held back b y archaic regulatory restrictions imposed by sp ectrum managers. In the search for a solution, it has b ecome clear that several interdisciplinary c hallenges still undermine the concepts of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) and Dynamic Spectrum Managemen t (DSM). In this pap er we take a step back from the technical detail of implementation and fo cus on iden tifying the key milestones to the success of DSM. In identifying a roadmap for DSM, we lo ok at the history of spectrum regulation, charting the k ey events in the transformation from free and op en spectrum into the tightly regulated system of ”Command & Control” that exists to day . W e outline the similarities b et ween DSM and op en sp ectrum and build on these to present the timeline for sp ectrum management in terms of a spectrum spiral. W e expand on this roadmap, breaking down the k ey drivers and barriers at each milestone. W e conclude that without sp ectrum scarcity , the concept of DSM is meaningless. But, given that prime sp ectrum is though t to be scarce, the key remaining barrier to the success of DSM is that of commercial viabilit y . • Jian w ei Huang, Randall Berry , and Michael L. Honig. Auction-based spec- trum sharing. MONET , 11(3):405–408, 2006 Abstr act : W e study auction mechanisms for sharing sp ectrum among a group of users, sub ject to a constraint on the interference temp erature at a measurement p oint. The users access the c hannel using spread spectrum signaling and so interfere with each other. Eac h user receives a utility that is a function of the receiv ed signal-to-interference plus noise ratio. W e propose t wo auction mec hanisms for allo cating the received power. The ﬁrst is an auction in which users are c harged for received SINR, which, when combined with logarithmic utilities, leads to a weigh ted max-min fair SINR allocation. The second is an auction in which users are charged for p o wer, which maximizes the total utilit y when the bandwidth is large enough and the receivers are co-lo cated. Both auction mechanisms are shown to b e socially optimal for a limiting “large system” with co-lo cated receivers, where bandwidth, p ow er and the num b er of users are increased in ﬁxed proportion. W e also formulate an iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm, and sp ecify conditions under which this algorithm conv erges globally to the Nash equilibrium of the auction. • Ling jie Duan, Jian wei Huang, and Biying Shou. Comp etition with dy- namic sp ectrum leasing. CoRR , abs/1003.5517, 2010 Abstr act : This pap er presents a comprehensiv e analytical study of t wo competitive cognitive op erators’ sp ectrum leasing and pricing strategies, taking into account operators’ heterogeneit y in leasing costs and users’ heterogeneity in transmission pow er and channel conditions. W e mo del the interactions b etw een op erators and users as a three-stage dynamic game, where op erators mak e simultaneous sp ectrum leasing and pricing decisions in Stages I and I I, and users make purchase decisions in Stage I I I. Us- ing bac kward induction, w e are able to completely characterize the game’s equilibria. W e sho w that both operators make the equilibrium leasing and pricing decisions based on simple threshold p olicies. Moreov er, tw o op er- ators alwa ys choose the same equilibrium price despite their diﬀerence in leasing costs. Each user receiv es the same signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at the equilibrium , and the obtained pa yoﬀ is linear in its transmission p ow er 11 and channel gain. W e also compare the duop oly equilibrium with the co or- dinated case where tw o operators coop erate to maximize their total proﬁt. W e show that the maximum loss of total proﬁt due to op erators’ com- petition is no larger than 25%. The users, how ever, always b eneﬁt from operators’ comp etition in terms of their pay oﬀs. W e show that most of these insigh ts are robust in the general SNR regime. • O. Ileri, D. Samardzija, and N.B. Manday am. Demand resp onsive pricing and comp etitive sp ectrum allo cation via a sp ectrum serv er. In New F r on- tiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks, 2005. DySP AN 2005. 2005 First IEEE International Symp osium on , pages 194 –202, 8-11 2005 Abstr act : In this pap er w e develop a framework for comp etition of fu- ture op erators likely to op erate in a mixed commons/prop erty-righ ts regime under the regulation of a sp ectrum policy server (SPS). The operators dy- namically comp ete for customers as well as portions of av ailable sp ectrum. The op erators are charged by the SPS for the amoun t of bandwidth they use in their services. Through demand responsive pricing, the operators try to come up with convincing service oﬀers for the customers, while trying to maximize their proﬁts. W e ﬁrst consider a single-user system as an illus- trative example. W e form ulate the competition b etw een the op erators as a non-coop erative game and prop ose an SPS-based iterative bidding scheme that results in a Nash equilibrium of the game. Numerical results suggest that, comp etition increases the user’s (customer’s) acceptance probability of the oﬀered service, while reducing the proﬁts ac hieved by the operators. It is also observed that as the cost of unit bandwidth increases relative to the cost of unit infrastructure (ﬁxed cost), the op erator with superior technology (higher ﬁxed cost) b ecomes more competitive. W e then extend the framew ork to a multiuser setting where the operators are competing for a num b er of users at once. W e prop ose an SPS-based bandwidth al- location scheme in whic h the SPS optimally allocates bandwidth p ortions for eac h user-op erator session to maximize its o verall expected rev enue re- sulting from the op erator payments. Comparison of the p erformance of this scheme to one in which the bandwidth is equally shared b etw een the user-operator pairs reveals that suc h an SPS-based sc heme improves the user acceptance probabilities and the bandwidth utilization in multiuser systems • O. Ileri, D. Samardzija, and N.B. Manday am. Dynamic prop erty rights sp ectrum access: Flexible ownership based sp ectrum managemen t. In New F r ontiers in Dynamic Sp e ctrum A c c ess Networks, 2007. DySP AN 2007. 2nd IEEE International Symp osium on , pages 254 –265, 17-20 2007 Abstr act : In this paper we develop a framew ork for op erator competi- tion based on short term o wnership of spectrum resources and devise a dy- namic spectrum access method called ”Dynamic Prop erty Rights Sp ectrum Access (D-Pass)”. In the D-Pass mo del, sp ectrum p ortions are allo cated to operators on a short term basis (few sessions) by a SPS (Spectrum P olicy Server) that serves as a controller/enforcer as well as a clearinghouse for spectrum allo cations. Prior to each short term allo cation, the SPS opti- mally determines a speciﬁc partition of spectrum resources among the op- erators to maximize a system related ob jective function. The operators are charged by the SPS for the amount of sp ectrum they are allo cated. Given the spectrum allocation, the operators comp ete with each other for users present in the system through demand responsive pricing, in the form of an iterative bidding sc heme reminiscen t of simultaneous ascending auctions. At every iteration, the operators make rate and price oﬀers for each user considering the bandwidth allo cated to them and their costs associated with serving the users. The users resp ond by declaring the probabilities with which they will accept the service oﬀers made. W e consider t wo dif- ferent ob jective functions for the SPS to maximize while determining the 12 exact partition of the sp ectrum resources: (1) the total exp ected bandwidth utilization, (2) the minimum acceptance probabilit y that a user accepts the oﬀered service. W e demonstrate several tradeoﬀs b et ween these ob jectives through numerical exp eriments and illustrate the eﬀect of bandwidth cost on these tradeoﬀs. Our results also suggest that employing short term allo- cation of resources could potentially lead to performance gains as opp osed to static allo cation of resources, esp ecially in regimes where the bandwidth is relativ ely exp ensive. • O. lleri and N.B. Manday am. Dynamic sp ectrum access mo dels: tow ard an engineering p ersp ectiv e in the spectrum debate. Communic ations Mag- azine, IEEE , 46(1):153 –160, january 2008 Abstr act : Until recently , the prop onents of sp ectrum commons and the prop onen ts of spectrum prop erty righ ts had settled, like the armies of the Marne, into their entrenc hed p ositions, emerging only to launch p e- riodic and unpro ductive attacks across a semantic and philosophical no man’s land. Recently , how ever, there hav e b een calls to mov e b eyond these entrenc hed p ositions, b y developing pragmatic mo dels and solutions that capture some of the beneﬁts of eac h philosophical p osition. In this article we cautiously enter that no man’s land with t wo illustrative dynamic sp ec- trum access mo dels. While b oth of our models retain a bias tow ard usage of spectrum resources based on a spectrum prop erty rights approach, they also promote dynamic access and short-term dedication of sp ectrum resources. W e call these mo dels dynamic prop ert y rights sp ectrum access (D-Pass) and dynamic commons prop erty rights spectrum access (D-CPass). In this work we focus primarily on engineering issues, prop osing the use of a spec- trum p olicy server as a clearinghouse and sp ecifying the sp ectrum access mechanisms relev ant to each model. T o demonstrate the useful studies enabled through these mo dels, w e presen t illustrativ e results via the band- width utilization ac hieved under eac h model. Our results indicate that both the spectrum access mechanism and market forces will pla y imp ortant roles in determining the resulting bandwidth utilization. • S.K. Ja ya weera and Tianming Li. Dynamic sp ectrum leasing in cognitiv e radio netw orks via primary-secondary user p ow er control games. Wir eless Communic ations, IEEE T r ansactions on , 8(6):3300 –3310, june 2009 Abstr act : Hierarc hical dynamic sp ectrum access (DSA) has received the most atten tion in recen t y ears as the solution for better sp ectrum uti- lization. In this pap er, on the other hand, we develop a framework for dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL). Po wer con trol in hierarc hical DSA net- works only in volv es that of controlling secondary user transmissions. Thus, in game theoretic form ulations of pow er control in cognitive DSA netw orks only secondary users are considered as play ers of the game. In proposed dynamic sp ectrum leasing, on the other hand, the primary users are re- warded for allowing secondary users to operate in their licensed sp ectrum. Thus, in the prop osed DSL netw orks the primary users hav e an incen- tive to allo w secondary users to access the sp ectrum whenever possible to the maximum extent. W e develop a game theoretic framework for such dynamic spectrum leasing in which primary users activ ely participate in a non-coop erative game with secondary users by selecting an interference cap on the total in terference they willing to tolerate. W e establish that the proposed primary-secondary user p ow er con trol game has a unique Nash equilibrium. Performance of a DSL system based on the proposed game model is compared through simulations under diﬀerent linear receivers at the secondary base station. • Y oungsun Kwon, Jungsub Lee, and Y oungkyun Oh. Economic and p ol- icy implications of sp ectrum license fee paymen t metho ds. T ele c ommun. Policy , 34(3):175–184, 2010 13 Abstr act : This pap er argues that ”Do auctions raise consumer prices?” is a misleading question. License fee paymen t methods, rather than spec- trum assignment methods, are key factors that bring forth diﬀerent mark et outcomes in the wireless telecomm unication industry . This pap er analyzes and discusses the eﬀects of three sp ectrum license fee paymen t methods- upfront lump-sum fees, roy alties, and proﬁt sharing-on economic eﬃciency , spectrum supply , and gov ernment reven ue. Roy alties create distortions in product and factor markets but can induce the gov ernment to increase spectrum supply and encourage ﬁrms’ inv estments. A cav eat is that the analyses are based on the model assuming monop oly mark et and informa- tion certain ty . • Thomas M. Lenard, Lawrence J. White, and James L. Riso. Increasing Sp ectrum for Broadband: What are the Options? SSRN eLibr ary , 2010 Abstr act : The growth of wireless broadband is a bright sp ot in the U.S. economy , but a shortage of ﬂexibly licensed spectrum rights could put a crimp on this expansion. F reeing up sp ectrum from other uses would allow greater expansion of wireless broadband and would bring substantial gains - likely in the hundreds of billions of dollars - for U.S. consumers, businesses, and the federal treasury . In this pap er we suggest three methods of making more sp ectrum av ailable for market-based allo cation, from b oth public and priv ate sources. • X.-Y. Li, P . Xu, S. T ang, and X. Ch u. Spectrum bidding in wireless net w orks and related. In COCOON ’08: Pr o c e e dings of the 14th annual international c onfer enc e on Computing and Combinatorics , pages 558– 567, Berlin, Heidelb erg, 2008. Springer-V erlag Abstr act : In this paper, we study the sp ectrum assignment problem for wireless access net works. Opportunistic spectrum usage is a promising tech- nology . Ho w ever, it could suﬀer from the selﬁsh b eha vior of secondary users. In order to impro ve opportunistic sp ectrum usage, w e prop ose to combine the game theory with wireless mo deling. Sev eral v ersions of problems are formalized under diﬀerent assumptions. W e design PT AS or eﬃcient ap- proximation algorithms for each of these problems suc h that ov erall so cial beneﬁt is maximized. Finally , we sho w how to design a truthful mec hanism based on all these algorithms. • E. Lic h ten b erger. Sp ectrum trading in German y , Austria and the UK: The inﬂuence of regulatory regimes and ev aluation of criteria on comp etition in the Europ ean mobile telecomm unication sector. In ITS Confer enc e , Helsinki, August 2003 Abstr act : Spectrum is one of the most important and v aluable assets of mobile telecommunications op erators. According to the options provided in the European Directives, national legislative bo dies are in the pro cess of deﬁning the regulatory framework for sp ectrum trading. While the de- tails of the individual regulations in the v arious member states may diﬀer, spectrum trading will, in any case, confront operators with a new challenge encompassing p otential comp etition, complexity , risks and opp ortunities. In German y , a ﬁrst draft of the new law has b een presented for public dis- cussion. In Austria, after a discussion process last year, the new la w w as supposed to be enacted before the summer of 2003. In the United King- dom, a draft communication bill is sub ject to broad and intense discussion. Despite the fact that all concepts are based on the Europ ean framew ork, when analysed in detail, the diﬀerences among the v arious countries are signiﬁcant. This pap er describes three national concepts, thereby sho wing the range of possibilities and considers the comp etition la w criteria that national regulatory authorities (NRA) might utilise when deciding whether to appro ve individual transactions. 14 • L. Mastro eni and M. Naldi. A real options mo del for the transferability v alue of telecommunications licenses. Annals of T ele c ommunic ations , 65(3- 4):201–210, April 2010 Abstr act : Licenses for telecommunications services are aw arded with a num b er of side obligations and commitments for the licensee. Under suc h obligations the licensee is typically not allow ed to transfer its license to another op erator. Such prohibition may cause heavy inconv eniences for customers, so that its remov al is strongly adv ocated and already a reality in many cases. Its remov al adds v alue to the original license and may then constitute a v aluable option (the transferabilit y option). A metho d is here prop osed to assess such v alue, b y using the framework of real options. The method is applied in a v ariety of settings and shows that the v alue of the option dep ends superlinearly on the reselling price and the market volatilit y , and linearly or sub-linearly on the expiry time of the option. • L. Mastro eni and M. Naldi. Option-based dynamic management of wireless sp ectrum. In NGI’09: Pr o c e e dings of the 5th Eur o-NGI c onfer enc e on Next Gener ation Internet networks , pages 55–62, Av eiro, Portugal, 1-3 July 2009. IEEE Press Abstr act : Dynamic sp ectrum management makes it p ossible for the owner of usage rights on some frequency blo cks to sublet each of them in real time and for a limited p erio d of time. As a softer implementation with respect to the spot market a tw o stage assignmen t is here prop osed through the use of options, whic h give buyers the right to purchase the usage righ t on a single block and for a timeslot. In the sale of options the primary owner may accomplish an ov erb o oking strategy , which consists in selling more blo cks than the a v ailable ones and acts as hedging against the risk of unsold blo cks. A mo del for the o verbo oking strategy is describ ed and ev al- uated, which tak es into accoun t b oth the v alue of the option, the correlated decisions tak en b y the prospective purc hasers, and the p enalty to be paid to the unsatisﬁed customers. The dependence of the economical conv enience of the ov erb o oking strategy on the relev ant parameters (among whic h the penalty v alue and the ov erb ooking factor) is shown for a signiﬁcant range of cases. • L. Mastro eni and M. Naldi. Spectrum reserv ation options for mobile vir- tual netw ork op erators. In NGI’10: Pr o c e e dings of the 6th Eur o-NGI c on- fer enc e on Next Gener ation Internet networks , Paris, F rance, 2-4 June 2010. IEEE Press Abstr act : Mobile Virtual Net work Operators (MVNO) op erate without owning sp ectrum usage rights, b y leasing sp ectrum from Mobile Netw ork Operators o wning a license. Spectrum leasing ma y o ccur through a reser- v ation pro cess that assigns the MVNO the right, but not the obligation, to lease sp ectrum at a later time. Reserv ation con tracts may be signed with strict guarantees, that pro vide MVNOs with the certaint y of obtaining the needed sp ectrum, or soft guarantees, whic h allow the MNO to adopt an o verbooking p olicy and refusing to lease the spectrum, comp ensating the refused MVNO through the pa yment of a penalty . In this pap er the tw o kinds of reserv ation contracts are compared from the viewp oint of the MVNO, by considering the proﬁtabilit y of the tw o alternatives. The cash ﬂows asso ciated to the tw o kinds of reserv ation contracts are determined and employ ed to compare the alternatives. The probability of o verbo oking and the expiry time of reserv ations app ear as the ma jor decision factors, while the p enalty v alue has a negligible inﬂuence. It is shown that the reser- v ation contract with soft guarantees is to be prefereed for larger v alues of the expiry time and for the lo wer v alues of the ov erb o oking probabilit y . 15 • L. Mastro eni and M. Naldi. Pricing of reserv ations for time-limited sp ec- trum leases under ov erb o oking. In 9th Confer enc e of T ele c ommunic ation, Me dia and Internet T e chno-Ec onomics CTTE 2010 , Ghen t, Belgium, 7-9 June 2010. IEEE Press Abstr act : With sp ectrum trading the owners of usage rights on wire- less sp ectrum may transfer them temp orarily to other users. A secondary market for sp ectrum may b e implemented through the use of reserv ation mechanisms, by which prosp ectiv e consumers of sp ectrum p ortions may ﬁrst bo ok them and decide later whether to actually buy the usage righ ts. A possible strategy for the o wners of usage righ ts is to practise o verbooking, i.e., to allow for more reserv ations than what they could sell (and then pay a p enalty if they cannot satisfy the requests). A relevan t problem for the owners of usage righ ts is to set the price for reserv ations. An algorithm is proposed here to price reserv ations in the presence of o verbo oking. The al- gorithm is based on the iterative use of the Co x-Ross-Rubinstein approac h to price ﬁnancial c al l options. The algorithm is then applied to a num b er of cases and the dep endence of the price on the ov erb o oking probability and the p enalty is analysed. • J.W. Ma yo and S. W allsten. Enabling eﬃcien t wireless communications: The role of secondary sp ectrum markets. Information Ec onomics and Policy , 22(1):61 – 72, 2010 Abstr act : Despite the p otentially critical nature of secondary markets in main taining eﬃcien t spectrum and wireless mark ets, researc h has to date has fo cused primarily on the F ederal Communication Commission’s rules for initial distribution of spectrum. T o redress this lacuna, we ﬁrst examine the ev olution of conceptual and policy developmen ts directed tow ard sec- ondary spectrummarkets. Then, w e seek to mov e beyond those eﬀorts to empirically do cument the developmen t of secondary spectrum activit y in the United States and the relationship of that dev elopment to the ev olving policy tow ard such markets. W e categorize and explore diﬀerent t yp es of secondary sp ectrum markets. Then, by drawing on a database of every spectrum license transaction since 1994, w e explore the depth and breadth of sp ectrum trading in secondary markets. W e ﬁnd that the FCC has radi- cally reduced the time it takes to approv e trades, making the system more akin to notiﬁcation than to appro v al. W e also ﬁnd that a large amoun t of spectrum changes hands each year. While these conclusions do not nec- essarily imply that secondary markets work eﬃciently , they do show that policy eﬀorts to facilitate and energize the growth of secondary spectrum- markets are b earing considerable fruit. • A.-H. Mohsenian-Rad, V.W.S. W ong, and V.C.M. Leung. Two-fold pricing to guaran tee individual proﬁts and maximum so cial w elfare in multi-hop wireless access netw orks. Wir eless Communic ations, IEEE T r ansactions on , 8(8):4110 –4121, august 2009 Abstr act : In a multi-hop wireless access netw ork, where each no de is an independent self-interested commercial entit y , pricing is helpful not only to encourage collaboration but also to utilize the netw ork resources eﬃciently . In this paper, we prop ose a market-based model with tw o-fold pricing (TFP) for wireless access net works. In our model, the rela y-pricing is used to encourage nodes to forward pac kets for other nodes. Each node receives a paymen t for the relay service that it provides. W e also consider interference-pricing to leverage optimal resource allocation. T ogether, the relay and interference prices incorporate both coop erativ e and competitive interactions among the no des. W e prov e that TFP guarantees p ositive proﬁt for eac h individual wireless no de for a wide range of pricing func- tions. The proﬁt increases as the node forwards more pack ets. Th us, the coop erative no des are well rewarded. W e then determine the relay and 16 interference pricing functions such that the net work social welfare and the aggregate netw ork utility are maximized. Simulation results show that, compared to t w o recently prop osed single-fold pricing mo dels, where only the rela y or only the interference prices are considered, our proposed TFP scheme signiﬁcantly increases the total netw ork proﬁt as well as the ag- gregate netw ork throughput. TFP also leads to more fair rev enue sharing among the wireless relay no des. • H. Mutlu, M. Alany ali, and D. Starobinski. Sp ot pricing of secondary sp ectrum access in wireless cellular netw orks. Networking, IEEE/A CM T r ansactions on , 17(6):1794–1804, Dec. 2009 Abstr act : Recent deregulation initiatives enable cellular pro viders to sell excess sp ectrum for secondary usage. In this paper, w e inv estigate the problem of optimal sp ot pricing of sp ectrum by a provider in the presence of b oth nonelastic primary users, with long-term commitments, and opp or- tunistic, elastic secondary users. W e ﬁrst show that optimal pricing can be formulated as an inﬁnite horizon av erage rew ard problem and solved using stochastic dynamic programming. Next, we inv estigate the design of eﬃ- cient single pricing policies. W e provide n umerical and analytical evidences that static pricing p olicies do not p erform well in such settings (in sharp contrast to settings where all the users are elastic). On the other hand, w e prov e that deterministic threshold pricing achiev es optimal proﬁt amongst all single-price policies and p erforms close to global optimal pricing. W e characterize the proﬁt regions of diﬀerent pricing p olicies, as a function of the arriv al rate of primary users. Under certain reasonable assumptions on the demand function, we prov e that the proﬁt region of threshold pricing is optimal and independent of the sp eciﬁc form of the demand function, and that it includes the proﬁt region of static pricing. In addition, w e show that the proﬁt function of threshold pricing is unimodal in price. W e determine a restricted in terv al in which the optimal threshold lies. These prop erties enable v ery eﬃcient computation of the optimal threshold policy , whic h is far faster than that of the global optimal p olicy . • M.J. Neely . Optimal pricing in a free market wireless netw ork. In INFO- COM 2007. 26th IEEE International Confer enc e on Computer Commu- nic ations. IEEE , pages 213 –221, 6-12 2007 Abstr act : W e consider an ad-ho c wireless netw ork op erating within a free market economic mo del. Users send data ov er a choice of paths, and scheduling and routing decisions are updated dynamically based on time v arying channel conditions, user mobilit y , and current net work prices charged by intermediate no des. Each no de sets its o wn price for relaying services, with the goal of earning reven ue that exceeds its time average reception and transmission exp enses. W e ﬁrst develop a greedy pricing strategy that maximizes so cial welfare while ensuring all participants make non-negative proﬁt. W e then construct a (non-greedy) p olicy that balances proﬁts more evenly by optimizing a proﬁt fairness metric. Both algorithms operate in a distributed manner and do not require knowledge of traﬃc rates or channel statistics. This work demonstrates that individuals can beneﬁt from carrying wireless devices even if they are not interested in their o wn p ersonal comm unication. • Dusit Niyato, Ekram Hossain, and Zh u Han. Dynamics of multiple-seller and m ultiple-buyer sp ectrum trading in cognitiv e radio netw orks: A game- theoretic mo deling approach. IEEE T r ansactions on Mobile Computing , 8(8):1009–1022, 2009 Abstr act : W e consider the problem of sp ectrum trading with multiple licensed users (i.e., primary users) selling spectrum opportunities to m ulti- ple unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users). The secondary users can adapt 17 the sp ectrum buying behavior (i.e., evolv e) by observing the v ariations in price and quality of sp ectrum oﬀered by the diﬀerent primary users or primary service pro viders. The primary users or primary service providers can adjust their b eha vior in selling the spectrum opportunities to secondary users to achiev e the highest utility . In this paper, we model the ev olution and the dynamic b ehavior of secondary users using the theory of evolution- ary game. An algorithm for the implemen tation of the ev olution pro cess of a secondary user is also presented. T o mo del the competition among the primary users, a nonco operative game is form ulated where the Nash equi- librium is considered as the solution (in terms of size of oﬀered sp ectrum to the secondary users and sp ectrum price). F or a primary user, an iterative algorithm for strategy adaptation to achiev e the solution is presented. The proposed game-theoretic framework for mo deling the interactions among multiple primary users (or service providers) and multiple secondary users is used to in vestigate netw ork dynamics under diﬀerent system parameter settings and under system p erturbation. • Dusit Niy ato and Ekram Hossain. A microeconomic mo del for hierarchical bandwidth sharing in dynamic sp ectrum access netw orks. Computers, IEEE T r ansactions on , 59(7):865 –877, july 2010 Abstr act : W e consider the problem of hierarchical bandwidth shar- ing in dynamic sp ectrum access (or cognitiv e radio) environmen t. In the system mo del under consideration, licensed service (i.e., primary service) can share/sell its av ailable bandwidth to an unlicensed service (i.e., sec- ondary service), and again, this unlicensed service can share/sell its allo- cated bandwidth to other services (i.e., tertiary and quaternary services). W e formulate the problem of hierarchical bandwidth sharing as an in ter- related market mo del used in micro economics for which a multiple-lev el market is established among the primary , secondary , tertiary , and quater- nary services. W e use the concept of demand and supply functions to obtain the equilibrium at which all the services are satisﬁed with the amount of allocated bandwidth and the price. These demand and supply functions are derived based on the utility of the connections using the diﬀerent services (i.e., primary , secondary , tertiary , and quaternary services). F or distributed implementation of the hierarc hical bandwidth sharing mo del in a system in which global information is not av ailable, iterative algorithms are prop osed through which each service adapts its strategies to reach the equilibrium. The system stability condition is analyzed for these algorithms. Finally , we demonstrate the application of the prop osed model to ac hieve dynamic bandwidth sharing in an integrated WiFi-WiMAX netw ork. • D. Niy ato and E. Hossain. Comp etitive spectrum sharing in cognitive radio net w orks: a dynamic game approach. Wir eless Communic ations, IEEE T r ansactions on , 7(7):2651 –2660, july 2008 Abstr act : ”Cognitiv e radio” is an emerging technique to improv e the utilization of radio frequency sp ectrum in wireless net works. In this pa- per, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary users. W e formulate this problem as an oligop oly market comp etition and use a noncoop erative game to obtain the sp ectrum allocation for secondary users. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solu- tion of this game. W e ﬁrst presen t the form ulation of a static game for the case where all secondary users ha ve the current information of the adopted strategies and the payoﬀ of eac h other. How ever, this assumption may not be realistic in some cognitive radio systems. Therefore, we consider the case of b ounded rationality in which the secondary users gradually and iteratively adjust their strategies based on the observ ations on their previ- ous strategies. The speed of adjustment of the strategies is controlled by the learning rate. The stabilit y condition of the dynamic b ehavior for this spectrum sharing scheme is inv estigated. The numerical results rev eal the dynamics of distributed dynamic adaptation of spectrum sharing strategies. 18 • D. Niyato, E. Hossain, and Zhu Han. Dynamic sp ectrum access in ieee 802.22- based cognitiv e wireless net w orks: a game theoretic mo del for com- p etitiv e spectrum bidding and pricing. Wir eless Communic ations, IEEE , 16(2):16 –23, april 2009 Abstr act : The emerging IEEE 802.22-based wireless regional area net- work technology will use the same radio sp ectrum currently allo cated for TV service. This standard will use the concept of cognitive radio based on dynamic sp ectrum access to pro vide wireless access services in a large co ver- age area. A brief o verview of the curren t state of the IEEE 802.22 standard is pro vided with a particular emphasis on the spectrum managemen t (i.e., spectrum sensing and dynamic spectrum access) in this standard. Key re- search issues related to spectrum trading among TV broadcasters, WRAN service providers, and IEEE 802.22-based cognitive radio users are identi- ﬁed. T o this end, a hierarchical sp ectrum trading model is presented to analyze the interaction among WRAN service providers, TV broadcasters, and WRAN users. In this mo del a double auction is established among multiple TV broadcasters and WRAN service providers who sell and buy the radio spectrum (i.e., TV bands), respectively . Again, multiple WRAN service pro viders compete with each other by adjusting the service price charged to WRAN users. W e prop ose a joint sp ectrum bidding and service pricing model for WRAN service providers to maximize their proﬁts. A non-coop erative game is formulated to obtain the solution in terms of the num b er of TV bands and the service price of a service provider. Numerical results are presen ted on the performance of this join t spectrum bidding and pricing model. • D. Niy ato and E. Hossain. Spectrum trading in cognitiv e radio net works: A market-equilibrium-based approac h. Wir eless Communic ations, IEEE , 15(6):71 –80, december 2008 Abstr act : Cognitive radio has emerged as a new design paradigm for the next-generation wireless netw orks. Cognitive radio netw orks are de- signed based on the concept of dynamic spectrum sharing where cognitiv e radio users can opp ortunistically share the radio sp ectrum. F or exam- ple, in case of vertical spectrum sharing, a sp ectrum owner (or primary user/service) can share (or sell) its licensed sp ectrum with (to) other users (i.e., secondary users/services). The economics of sp ectrum sharing, whic h is referred to as sp ectrum trading, is the fo cus of this article. The ob jective of sp ectrum trading is to maximize the revenue of the sp ectrum owner, and at the same time enhance the satisfaction of the cognitiv e radio users. W e ﬁrst discuss the diﬀerent network architectures and proto col b eha v- iors for dynamic sp ectrum sharing as well as the sp ectrum sharing mo dels. Then the scop e of sp ectrum trading is discussed in the con text of diﬀerent spectrum sharing mo dels. The primary research issues related to sp ectrum trading in cognitiv e radio net w orks are outlined, and the possible solution approaches are discussed. T o this end, we introduce a market-equilibrium- based spectrum trading mechanism that uses spectrum demand and supply of the primary and secondary users, respectively . Since spectrum supply is stochastic in nature, a distributed and adaptive learning algorithm is used for the secondary users to estimate spectrum price and adjust the spectrum demand accordingly so that the mark et equilibrium can be reached. • S. Olafsson, B. Glo v er, and M. Nek ov ee. F uture management of spectrum. BT T e chnolo gy Journal , 25(2):52–63, 2007 Abstr act : As the heterogeneit y of wireless access tec hnologies increases, dynamic allo cation and utilisation of spectrum become ever more imp or- tant. The traditional rigid allocation of spectrum for technology-speciﬁc usage is not suitable for the increasingly dynamic demand driven by the contin uous emergence of technologies providing new services with diﬀer- ent qualit y of service requirements. New spectrum management tec hniques 19 and increasingly ﬂexible sp ectrum usage righ ts are therefore called for. W e discuss the limitations of present sp ectrum managemen t techniques and ex- plore some new alternativ es including sp ectrum trading and opportunistic spectrum access. • J.M. Peha. Sp ectrum management p olicy options. Communic ations Sur- veys T utorials, IEEE , 1(1):2 –8, ﬁrst 1998 Abstr act : As market-based reform sw eeps telecommunications indus- tries around the world, it is a go o d time to reev aluate the spectrum man- agement p olicies which govern wireless industries ranging from broadcast television to satellite communications. Most countries hav e b een using a central planning approac h to spectrum managemen t, but there are man y alternatives with v arying degrees of ﬂexibility and mark et-based incentiv es. This paper pro vides a survey of spectrum management approaches, address- ing methods of determining how sp ectrum can be used, which commercial entities can use it, and ho w gov ernments can manage their own spectrum. It identiﬁes some of the crucial choices to b e made, and summarizes advan- tages and disadvan tages of eac h. • J.M. Peha. Approaches to sp ectrum sharing. Communic ations Magazine, IEEE , 43(2):10 –12, feb. 2005 Abstr act : Many complain ab out sev ere spectrum shortage. The short- age comes from outdated spectrum p olicies that allo ws for little sharing. Regulators hav e granted licenses that oﬀer exclusive access to the sp ec- trum. When these licensees are not transmitting, the sp ectrum sits idle. A new tec hnology regarding sp ectrum shortage enables more spectrum shar- ing that unleashes inno v ative products and services, pro vided that we adopt the appropriate spectrum policies. Two camps are pushing for extreme re- form, one for ”prop erty rights” and the other for ”spectrum commons”. This article presen ts concepts underlying the ”property” and ”commons” debate, clariﬁes options for spectrum reform, and describ es the trade-oﬀs of spectrum sharing. • J.M. P eha. Sharing sp ectrum through sp ectrum p olicy reform and cogni- tiv e radio. Pr o c e e dings of the IEEE , 97(4):708 –719, april 2009 Abstr act : T raditionally , interference protection is guaran teed through a policy of sp ectrum licensing, whereby wireless systems get exclusiv e access to sp ectrum. This is an eﬀective wa y to preven t in terference, but it leads to highly ineﬃcient use of sp ectrum. Cognitiv e radio along with softw are radio, sp ectrum sensors, mesh netw orks, and other emerging technologies can facilitate new forms of sp ectrum sharing that greatly improve sp ectral eﬃciency and alleviate scarcity , if p olicies are in place that supp ort these forms of sharing. On the other hand, new technology that is inconsistent with spectrum p olicy will ha ve little impact. This pap er discusses policies that can enable or facilitate use of many sp ectrum-sharing arrangemen ts, where the arrangements are categorized as b eing based on co existence or coop eration and as sharing among equals or primary-secondary sharing. A shared spectrum band ma y be managed directly by the regulator, or this re- sponsibility may b e delegated in large part to a license-holder. The t yp e of sharing arrangement and the entit y that manages it hav e a great impact on which tec hnical approac hes are viable and eﬀective. The most eﬃcient and cost-eﬀective form of spectrum sharing will dep end on the t ype of systems inv olved, where systems under current consideration are as diverse as tele- vision broadcasters, cellular carriers, public safety systems, p oint-to-point links, and p ersonal and lo cal-area netw orks. In addition, while cognitive radio oﬀers policy-makers the opp ortunity to improv e sp ectral eﬃciency , cognitive radio also pro vides new challenges for p olicy enforcement. A re- sponsible regulator will not allow a device in to the marketplace that might harm other systems. Thus, designers must seek innov ative wa ys to assure 20 regulators that new devices will comply with policy requirements and will not cause harmful interference. • G. Pogorel. Radio Spectrum Policy and Management: A Turning Poin t? Communic ations & Str ate gies , pages 109–117, 1st quarter 2003 • S. Sengupta and M. Chatterjee. An economic framew o rk for dynamic sp ectrum access and service pricing. Networking, IEEE/ACM T r ansac- tions on , 17(4):1200 –1213, aug. 2009 Abstr act : The concept of dynamic sp ectrum access will allow the radio spectrum to b e traded in a mark et lik e scenario allo wing wireless service providers (WSPs) to lease c hunks of spectrum on a short-term basis. Such market mechanisms will lead to competition among WSPs where they not only comp ete to acquire spectrum but also attract and retain users. Cur- rently , there is little understanding on ho w such a dynamic trading system will op erate so as to mak e the system feasible under economic terms. In this pap er, we prop ose an economic framework that can b e used to guide i) the dynamic sp ectrum allocation process and ii) the service pricing mech- anisms that the providers can use. W e prop ose a knapsack based auction model that dynamically allocates sp ectrum to the WSPs such that reven ue and sp ectrum usage are maximized. W e b orrow techniques from game the- ory to capture the conﬂict of interest b et w een WSPs and end users. A dynamic pricing strategy for the providers is also proposed. W e show that even in a greedy and non-co op erative b eha vioral game mo del, it is in the best interest of the WSPs to adhere to a price and channel threshold which is a direct consequence of price equilibrium. Through sim ulation results, w e show that the proposed auction mo del entices WSPs to participate in the auction, mak es optimal use of the spectrum, and av oids collusion among WSPs. W e demonstrate how pricing can be used as an eﬀective to ol for providing incen tives to the WSPs to upgrade their net work resources and oﬀer better services. • J.A. Stine. Enabling secondary sp ectrum markets using ad ho c and mesh net w orking protocols. Journal of Communic ations , 1(1):26–37, 2006 Abstr act : Sp ectrum management is the pro cess of deciding how ra- dio frequency (RF) sp ectrum may be used in a geographical region and who may use it. T raditionally , sp ectrum management has been executed as an administrative and p olitical pro cess with the inten t of making last- ing decisions. Its lack of resp onsiv eness and resolution causes muc h sp ec- trum to lay fallow since most users rarely need sp ectrum con tinuously and ubiquitously . In this pap er, we prop ose an alternative sp ectrum manage- ment approac h that enables management at a greater temp oral and spatial resolution using netw orks and wireless ad hoc and mesh netw orking tech- nologies. Three diﬀerent sp ectrum management ideas are describ ed. The Synchronous Collision Resolution (SCR) MAC proto col enables a strict arbitration of spectrum access based on spectrum rights thus enabling a hierarch y of netw orks in the same sp ectrum that alwa ys guarantees the primary rights holder precedence. Second, it autonomously manages the use of an arbitrary num ber of channels in the same netw ork. The third and most exciting idea is a new fast command and control mo del for spectrum management. An underlying ad ho c netw ork built using the No des State Routing* (NSR) protocol is used to track and manage the use of spectrum of attached RF emitters. NSR tracks the state of the netw ork by collecting and disseminating the states of the no des. These states can include relev ant information on the sp ectrum these no des are using and are observing oth- ers use. Th us the net work supp orts trac king and monitoring sp ectrum use spatially in near real time. Sp ectrum management utilities built on top of the netw ork could allow users and sp ectrum managers to rapidly negotiate the use of sp ectrum and assist spectrum managers in iden tifying un used 21 spectrum and emitters causing harmful interference. W e conclude with proposed standardization and regulatory c hanges to mak e this feasible. • U. Stumpf and L. Nett. The economics of frequency trading. In ITS Eur op e an R e gional Confer enc e , 22-24 August 2003 • L´ aszl´ o T ok a and Attila Vid´ acs. General distributed economic framew ork for dynamic spectrum allocation. Computer Communic ations , 32(18):1955 – 1964, 2009. Cognitiv e Radio and Dynamic Sp ectrum Sharing Systems Abstr act : The emergence of no vel radio tec hniques enables the applica- tion of adv antageous rev olutionary sp ectrum policies. An imp ortant b o dy of research has appeared about p ossible frequency managemen t schemes, but none of them prop oses solutions that meet every related criteria. In this paper w e presen t our work on dynamic sp ectrum allo cation and pricing that oﬀers a distributed mechanism design, well-suited to practical employmen t issues. Our mo del handles interference eﬀects without any restricting as- sumptions, pro vides universal scalable and incen tive-compatible allocation and pricing mechanisms. W e provide b oth analytical and numerical ev alu- ation of the prop osed framew ork, and in either case w e prov e this latter to be a suitable approac h to eﬃcien t and ﬂexible sp ectrum utilization. • T.M. V alletti. Sp ectrum Trading. T ele c ommunic ations Policy , 30:655–670, Octob er 2001 Abstr act : This paper argues that the curren t centralised model of spec- trum managemen t is highly ineﬃcient and should b e replaced with decen- tralised solutions. The current model suppresses competitive en try , blocks eﬃcient sp ectrum use, and insulates old technologies from inno v ative chal- lenge. In the new system, the default rule should endow operators with the highest ﬂexibilit y , leaving the regulator to monitor the prop er working of competition rather than deciding who do es what. • X. W ang, Z. Li, P . Xu, Y. Xu, X. Gao, and H.-H. Chen. Sp ectrum sharing in cognitive radio netw orks: An auction-based approach. Systems, Man, and Cyb ernetics, Part B: Cyb ernetics, IEEE T r ansactions on , 40(3):587 –596, june 2010 Abstr act : Cognitive radio is emerging as a promising tec hnique to im- prov e the utilization of the radio frequency sp ectrum. In this pap er, we consider the problem of sp ectrum sharing among primary (or ”licensed”) users (PUs) and secondary (or ”unlicensed”) users (SUs). W e form ulate the problem based on bandwidth auction, in which eac h SU mak es a bid for the amount of sp ectrum and each PU may assign the sp ectrum among the SUs by itself according to the information from the SUs without degrading its own performance. W e show that the auction is a noncoop erative game and that Nash equilibrium (NE) can be its solution. W e ﬁrst consider a single- PU netw ork to inv estigate the existence and uniqueness of the NE and further discuss the fairness among the SUs under given conditions. Then, we presen t a dynamic up dating algorithm in which each SU achiev es NE in a distributed manner. The stabilit y condition of the dynamic b ehavior for this spectrum-sharing scheme is studied. The discussion is generalized to the case in which there are m ultiple PUs in the netw ork, where the prop- erties of the NE are shown under appropriate conditions. Simulations were used to ev aluate the system p erformance and verify the eﬀectiv eness of the proposed algorithm. 22 • D. Willkomm, S. Machira ju, J. Bolot, and A. W olisz. Primary user b e- ha vior in cellular netw orks and implications for dynamic sp ectrum access. Communic ations Magazine, IEEE , 47(3):88–95, Marc h 2009 Abstr act : Dynamic sp ectrum access approaches, whic h prop ose to op- portunistically use underutilized p ortions of licensed wireless spectrum suc h as cellular bands, are increasingly b eing seen as a wa y to alleviate spectrum scarcity . Howev er, b efore DSA approac hes can b e enabled, it is important that w e understand the dynamics of spectrum usage in licensed bands. Our focus in this article is the cellular band. Using a unique dataset collected inside a cellular netw ork operator, we analyze the usage in cellular bands and discuss the implications of our results on enabling DSA in these bands. One of the k ey asp ects of our dataset is its scale-it consists of data collected ov er three w eeks at h undreds of base stations. W e dissect this data along diﬀerent dimensions to characterize if and when sp ectrum is av ailable, de- velop mo dels of primary usage, and understand the implications of these results on DSA techniques such as sensing. • Y ongle W u, Beib ei W ang, K.J.R. Liu, and T.C. Clancy . A scalable collusion- resistan t m ulti-winner cognitiv e sp ectrum auction game . Communic ations, IEEE T r ansactions on , 57(12):3805 –3816, december 2009 Abstr act : Dynamic sp ectrum access (DSA), enabled b y cognitiv e ra- dio tec hnologies, has become a promising approach to improv e eﬃciency in sp ectrum utilization, and the sp ectrum auction is one imp ortant DSA approach, in which secondary users lease some un used bands from primary users. How ever, spectrum auctions are diﬀerent from existing auctions studied by economists, b ecause sp ectrum resources are interference-limited rather than quan tity-limited, and it is p ossible to a ward one band to mul- tiple secondary users with negligible mutual interference. T o accommo date this sp ecial feature in wireless communications, in this pap er, we present a nov el m ulti-winner spectrum auction game not existing in auction litera- ture. As secondary users ma y be selﬁsh in nature and tend to b e dishonest in pursuit of higher proﬁts, we develop eﬀective mechanisms to suppress their dishonest/collusiv e b ehaviors when secondary users distort their v alu- ations about sp ectrum resources and interference relationships. Moreov er, in order to make the prop osed game scalable when the size of problem grows, the semi-deﬁnite programming (SDP) relaxation is applied to re- duce the complexit y signiﬁcantly . Finally , simulation results are presented to ev aluate the proposed auction mechanisms, and demonstrate the com- plexity reduction as well. • P . Xa vier and D. Ypsilan ti. P olicy issues in sp ectrum trading. Info - The journal of p olicy, r e gulation and str ate gy for tele c ommunic ations , 8:34– 61(28), 1 March 2006 Abstr act : Purp ose - An asp ect of sp ectrum reform receiving increasing attention is the introduction of secondary mark ets for spectrum in order to enable more ﬂexibility to reassign unused and underused sp ectrum to users that will use it more eﬃcien tly . This pap er prop oses to fo cus on the p olicy issues relating to the dev elopment of w ell-functioning secondary markets for spectrum. Design/metho dology/approac h - The paper reviews developmen ts in the debate ov er secondary markets for sp ectrum. It draws together key elements from the academic literature, v arious governmen t and go v ernment- commissioned reports, and the practical exp erience of the few countries that hav e already introduced sp ectrum trading. There is considerable fo cus on concerns and p otential costs relating to the in tro duction of spectrum trading and liberalisation. This has a constructive aim - to draw attention to the need to address such concerns in order to facilitate the developmen t of spectrum trading. 23 Findings - While there is a p ersuasive case for spectrum trading, countries hav e b een slo w to introduce it b ecause of a n umber of concerns. This paper identiﬁes these concerns and the regulatory framework/policies needed to address them. Originalit y/v alue - The pap er distils the p olicy issues in the debate o ver spectrum trading and identiﬁes the role that regulators will need to pla y in the introduction, facilitation and regulation of secondary markets for spectrum. • Yiping Xing, R. Chandramouli, and C. Cordeiro. Price dynamics in com- p etitiv e agile sp ectrum access mark ets. Sele cte d Ar e as in Communic ations, IEEE Journal on , 25(3):613 –621, april 2007 Abstr act : W e explore the price dynamics in a competitive market con- sisting of sp ectrum agile net work service providers and users. Here, multi- ple self in terested spectrum pro viders operating with diﬀerent technologies and costs comp ete for p otential customers. Diﬀerent buy ers or consumers may ev aluate the same seller diﬀerently dep ending on their applications, operating tec hnologies and lo cations. Two diﬀerent buyer p opulations, the quality-sensitiv e and the price-sensitive are inv estigated, and the result- ing collective price dynamics are studied using a com bination of analysis and sim ulations. V arious scenarios are considered regarding the nature and accuracy of information av ailable to the sellers. A m yopically optimal strat- egy is studied when full information is av ailable, while a sto chastic learning based strategy is considered when the information is limited. Co op erating groups may b e formed among the sellers which will in-turn inﬂuence the group proﬁt for those participants. F ree riding phenomenon is observed under certain circumstances. • Hui Y u, Lin Gao, Y un Li, Xiao ying Gan, Xin bing W ang, Y ouyun Xu, W en Chen, and A.V. V asilakos. Information sharing in spectrum auction for dynamic sp ectrum access. In Glob al T ele c ommunic ations Confer enc e, 2009. GLOBECOM 2009. IEEE , pages 1 –5, no v. 2009 Abstr act : Sp ectrum under-utilization is one of the bottlenecks of the de- velopmen t of wireless communication, and dynamic sp ectrum access (DSA) is envisioned as a nov el mechanism to solve the problem of sp ectrum scarcity . Spectrum auction has been recognized as an eﬀective way to ac hieve DSA, wherein the primary spectrum owner (PO) acts as an auctioneer who has free channels and is willing to sell them for additional reven ue, and the secondary user (SU) acts as a bidder who is willing to buy a channel from POs for its service. In this paper, w e adopt a progressive sp ectrum auction named MAP , which has b een prov ed optimal and incentiv e compatible in DSA netw orks with distributed POs and SUs. How ever, in MAP , the proﬁt of POs is not maximized under the equilibrium point due to the scarcity of SUs’ priv ate information kno wn by POs. W e propose an information shar- ing mechanism, in which the POs exchange their local information with each other. W e show analytically that, allo wing information sharing, eac h PO is able to learn the priv ate information of SUs and increase its proﬁt accordingly . Long term proﬁt acts as the incentive for information sharing that all the POs automatically reveal the true information when they are aw are of this. It is notable that information sharing doesn’t aﬀect so cial optimality . Simulation shows the increase of POs’ proﬁts in the sense of long term interests. 24

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